Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 33

Issue 3

Article 1

6-1-2013

Before You Press Record: Unanswered Questions Surrounding the
First Amendment Right to Film Public Police Activity
Jesse Harlan Alderman

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Jesse Harlan Alderman, Before You Press Record: Unanswered Questions Surrounding the First
Amendment Right to Film Public Police Activity, 33 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 485 (2013).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

Before You Press Record: Unanswered
Questions Surrounding the First Amendment
Right to Film Public Police Activity
JESSE HARLAN ALDERMAN1
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 486
II. FIRST AND SEVENTH CIRCUIT OPINIONS DEFINING A FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RECORD POLICE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
THEIR PUBLIC DUTIES....................................................................... 488
A. GLIK V. CUNNIFFE ...................................................................... 488
1.
The First Amendment ...................................................... 491
2.
Qualified Immunity from § 1983 Civil Liability.............. 493
B. ACLU V. ALVAREZ ........................................................................ 494
1.
The Illinois Eavesdropping Statute ................................. 494
2.
The ACLU “Test Case” ................................................. 497
3.
The First Amendment ...................................................... 499
i. The Right to Gather, Disseminate, and Receive
Information ............................................................... 499
ii. Intermediate Scrutiny................................................ 501
iii. Judge Posner’s Dissent in Alvarez ............................ 504
III. Unanswered Questions ..................................................................... 506
A.

WILL OTHER COURTS BE PERSUADED BY JUDGE POSNER’S
DISSENT? ................................................................................... 506

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The Right is Not Placed in a Recognized Constitutional
Framework ...................................................................... 507
The First Amendment Protects More Than Prior
Restraint .......................................................................... 508
The Right at Issue is Imprecisely Defined and
Analyzed .......................................................................... 509
The Dissent Admits the Eavesdropping Statute is Too
Draconian and Proposes an Unrealistic Exception........ 511
A First Amendment Right to Record Police in Public
Does Not Imperil Statutes That Criminalize Recordation
Conversations Where Both Parties Own a Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy .................................................... 512

1. Jesse Harlan Alderman is an attorney in the Administrative Law Department at
Foley Hoag LLP in Boston and a former reporter for The Associated Press. J.D., Boston
College Law School, summa cum laude, M.S., Columbia University Graduate School of
Journalism, B.A., Tufts University, summa cum laude. Thanks Dad.

485

486

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6.
7.
8.
9.
B.

The Content-Based vs. Content-Neutral Distinction....... 518
Statutes That Create Exceptions for Police Officers, the
Media, and Other Preferred Recording Parties are
Content-Based and Deserve Strict Scrutiny .................... 519

IS SURREPTITIOUS RECORDING OF POLICE IN THE PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES PROTECTED FROM PUNISHMENT
BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT? ..................................................... 523

1.
2.
3.
4.
D.

There is no Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy in the
Contents of a Conversation Between a Citizen and a Police
Officer Acting in His Official Capacity........................... 513
A Positive First Amendment Right to Record Public Police
Activity Does Not Jeopardize Arrests for Filming Police in
Derogation of Other Laws .............................................. 514
The First Amendment Right Does Not Eliminate the
Common Law “Invasion of Privacy” Torts .................... 516
The First Amendment Right Will Not Inhibit Effective Law
Enforcement .................................................................... 517

WHICH CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF REVIEW WILL FUTURE
COURTS APPLY? ......................................................................... 518

1.
2.
C.

[Vol. 33

The States that Proscribe Certain Surreptitious
Recordation ..................................................................... 524
Enforcing the Distinction is Impracticable ..................... 525
Enforcing the Distinction Captures Too Much Important
Political Speech to be Constitutional .............................. 526
The Government Interest in Protected Conversational
Privacy is not Better Served by Laws Banning Surreptitious
Recordation of Police Officers........................................ 530

ARE OFFICERS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL
LIABILITY FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARRESTS OF RECORDERS OF
PUBLIC POLICE ACTIVITY? ......................................................... 531

The “Clearly Established” Framework .......................... 532
There is a “Robust Consensus” of Persuasive
Authority ......................................................................... 533
3.
Kelly is Likely an Outlier................................................ 535
IV. Conclusion ....................................................................................... 536
1.
2.

I.

INTRODUCTION

After a wave of high profile arrests of smartphone-toting citizens
whose only crime was recording police officers in the exercise of their public duties, constitutional challenges to state wiretapping laws that prohibit
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such activity has reached two circuit courts of appeals.2 In 2011, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued its opinion in Glik v. Cunniffe,
holding that not only did the First Amendment right to record police exist,
but, despite a paucity of case law, this right was so “self-evident” to be considered of longstanding vintage.3 In 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit followed suit in Alvarez v. ACLU.4 Like the First Circuit,
the Seventh Circuit located the right to record police within the compass of
the First Amendment’s protection of the inextricably related constellation
of rights to gather, disseminate, and receive information of public importance.5 The court enjoined enforcement of Illinois’s notably draconian
eavesdropping statute as applied to civilian recordation of police officers in
the public exercise of their official duties, over the dissent of conservative
Judge Richard A. Posner.6
This Article examines the several unanswered legal questions that remain in the wake of Glik and Alvarez. Though Glik and Alvarez hold sway
only within their respective jurisdictions, it seems likely that the right to
record public police activity will be treated as universal. Opinions of the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits contain terse recognition dicta of such a First
Amendment liberty, while no courts have rendered an opinion to the contrary.7 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari from the
Cook County State’s Attorney’s office in Alvarez.8 However, there remain
questions regarding the definition of the right and its placement in existing
2. See, e.g., Jacob Sullum, Eavesdropping Law Shields Officials, CHI. SUN TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2011, http://www.suntimes.com/news/otherviews/7905816-452/eavesdroppinglaw-shields-officials.html (describing the arrest of Michael Allison for recording conversations with police officers at court hearing); Douglas Stanglin, Woman Arrested in Her Yard
While
Videotaping
Police,
USA
TODAY,
June
23,
2011,
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/06/woman-in-her-frontyard-arrested-while-videotaping-police-at-a-traffic-stop-at-curb/1#.UZ0FPb_vzjA (describing the arrest of Emily Good for filming officers engaged in traffic stop from her driveway);
Daniel Rowinski, Police Fight Cellphone Recordings: Witnesses Taking Audio of Officers
Arrested, Charged with Illegal Surveillance, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2010,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/01/12/police_fight_cellphon
e_recordings/ (recounting the arrest of Simon Glik for recording the arrest of a man on Boston Common and several other similar arrests under the Massachusetts wiretap statute).
3. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
4. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
5. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595-603; Glik, 655 F.3d at 82-84.
6. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 608-14.
7. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (recognizing
the First Amendment right to “record matters of public interest”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle,
55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (also recognizing the First Amendment right to “record
matters of public interest”).
8. Tal Kopen, Supreme Court Won’t Hear Police Recording Case, POLITICO, Nov.
26, 2012, available at http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2012/11/supremecourt-wont-hear-police-recording-case-150290.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
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First Amendment jurisprudence. Similarly, it has been left unsettled whether the right is one that will be susceptible to vindication in civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”).
Part II of this Article provides summaries of the Glik and Alvarez
opinions and recites the key arguments in Judge Posner’s dissent. Part III
identifies four unanswered questions that remain unsettled in the wake of
the Glik and Alvarez holdings. Part III.A. examines whether future courts
analyzing the issue will be persuaded by Judge Posner’s dissent and determines that the dissent—while a thought provoking commentary—is too
divorced from cognizable First Amendment jurisprudence to be persuasive.
Part III.B. asks which constitutional standard of review future courts will
apply when laws that interfere with the right to record public police activity
are challenged. After analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s justification for application of “intermediate scrutiny,” this Part concludes that more substantial constitutional arguments militate in favor of testing these challenges
under “strict scrutiny.” Part III.C. acknowledges that both Glik and Alvarez
only stand for the proposition that “open” recordation of police is safeguarded by the First Amendment. After a brief summary of states that prohibit at least some forms of surreptitious recording of police, Part II.C. proposes that an open-surreptitious dichotomy in the enforcement of wiretapping laws, as applied to recorders of police, is untenable, and criminalization of surreptitious recording of police officers performing their public
duties should fail even under the more deferential intermediate scrutiny
calculus. Finally, Part III.D. examines whether the right to record police is
“clearly established” under the First Amendment, a finding that, if made by
future courts, would vitiate qualified immunity from civil liability for government actors who violate the right.
II.
FIRST AND SEVENTH CIRCUIT OPINIONS DEFINING A FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RECORD POLICE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR
PUBLIC DUTIES
A recitation of the important holdings in Glik and Alvarez is provided
in Parts A and B of this Section. Judge Posner’s dissent in Alvarez is discussed in Part C.
A.

GLIK V. CUNNIFFE

In August 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was the
first court to establish a positive First Amendment right to record official
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police activity in public.9 On the evening of October 1, 2007, a young attorney named Simon Glik was walking in Boston Common, which the First
Circuit aptly described as “the oldest city park in the United States and the
apotheosis of a public forum.”10 In the distance, three police officers were
arresting another man.11 Glik approached and heard another bystander say:
“You are hurting him, stop.”12 He took from his pocket the most ubiquitous
symbol of modern America: his cell phone.13Activating the camera application, he stood at a ten-foot distance and recorded video footage of the arrest.14After placing the suspect in handcuffs, one of the officers turned to
Glik and said, “I think you have taken enough pictures.”15 The officer asked
if Glik’s cell phone recorded audio, which Glik answered affirmatively. 16
Glik was then arrested for unlawful interception of an oral communication
in violation of the Massachusetts wiretap statute, disturbing the peace, and
aiding in the escape of a prisoner (this being the “non-escaped” prisoner
who, like Glik, was carted off to booking).17 The arrest led to the first of
two circuit court declarations in favor of a First Amendment right to film
public police activity in less than a year, and not just reams of bad press for
the City of Boston but $170,000 to settle Glik’s subsequent civil rights
suit.18 Though untold hundreds—or thousands—of citizens have been ar9. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011). The First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend I.
10. Glik, 655 F.3d at 79, 84. See Declan McCullagh, Boston Admits It: Cell Phone
Photography Is Not a Crime, CNET NEWS, Mar. 27, 2012, available at
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-57405594-281/boston-admits-it-cell-phonephotography-is-not-a-crime/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
11. Glik, 655 F.3d at 79. The three Boston police officers were John Cunniffe, Peter
J. Savalis, and Jerome Hall-Brewster. Id. at 78. Glik brought suit against them in their individual capacities and against the City of Boston pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates
a private cause of action for vindication of one’s civil rights when violated by anyone acting
under color of law. Id. at 79.
12. Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.
13. Id. at 80.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Glik, 655 F.3d at 80. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 99(B)(4) (2008) (defining
“interception” to mean “to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear or
record the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any intercepting
device by any person other than a person given prior authority by all parties to such communication”); Id. § 99(C)(1) (prohibiting the willful “interception . . . of any wire or oral communication”). The statute imposes maximum penalties of $10,000 in fines and five years in
prison, or both. Id.
18. Glik, 655 F.3d at 82-84. See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595-603 (7th Cir.
2012); McCullagh, supra note 10.

490

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

rested for the same spurious “wiretapping offense,” this time they messed
with a defense attorney.19
Glik successfully defended the charge in court.20 A municipal judge
ruled that Glik could not have contravened the wiretap statute by holding
his phone in plain view, where the statute plainly proscribes only “secret”
interception of a conversation without the consent of all parties to that
communication.21 The municipal judge also laid the groundwork for the
First Circuit’s holding that Glik’s recording found shelter in the Constitution, writing that the “officers were unhappy that they were being recorded
during an arrest . . . does not make a lawful exercise of a First Amendment
right a crime.”22 Glik then filed an internal affairs complaint with the Boston Department, which was never investigated.23
Undeterred, Glik filed a civil rights action against the officers and the
City of Boston under § 1983.24 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss.25
The defendants first argued that the First Amendment does not protect
Glik’s acts of audio-recording police officers in the pursuit of their public
duties.26 In the alternative, the defendants argued that they were entitled to
qualified immunity from civil liability because even if protected by the constitution, the right was not “clearly established” at the time of violation.27
This argument falls under the qualified immunity doctrine, in which all
federal circuits impose essentially the same standard barring claims under §
1983 unless (i) the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the
alleged civil rights violation, and (ii) “a reasonable defendant would have
understood that his conduct violated the plaintiff[’s] constitutional rights.”28
Here, had the right to record police been of new vintage, and not clearly
enshrined in the law, the individual officers would not be liable.

19. See Sullum, supra note 2; Stanglin, supra note 2; Rowinski, supra note 2 (examples of arrests).
20. See Mass. v. Glik, No. 0701 CR 6687, slip op. at 2-3 (Boston Mun. Ct. Jan. 31,
2008).
21. Id. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 §§ 99(B)(4) & (C)(1) (2008). See also Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001) (holding the wiretap statute extends protection from non-consensual, surreptitious recording to all “members of the public, including
. . . police officers or other public officials interacting with members of the public”).
22. Glik, 655 F.3d at 80.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 80-81.
27. Glik, 655 F.3d at 81. See Michael Potere, Note, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?: Citizens Recording Police Conduct, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 273, 286-89 (2012) (discussing qualified immunity doctrine).
28. Glik, 655 F.3d at 81.
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The First Amendment

On the first point, the First Circuit held unambiguously that there is a
constitutionally protected right to videotape police carrying out their duties
in public.29 The First Circuit held that this constitutional protection is located in the First Amendment’s broad prohibition against government efforts
“limiting the stock of information from which the public may draw.” 30 Under the aegis of the First Amendment’s clause safeguarding “freedom . . . of
the press,” the court held that the Constitution protects the interconnected
rights of citizens “to gather news from any source by means within the law”
and, concomitantly, “to receive information and ideas.”31 The court elaborated that filming police officers in the exercise of their public duties promotes the “cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and promoting
‘the free discussion of governmental affairs.’”32 Such political speech has
long been recognized to form the core of the First Amendment.33 In no
small measure did the unique status of police officers influence the court’s
holding. It wrote: “This is particularly true of law enforcement officials,
who are granted substantial discretion that may be misused to deprive individuals of their liberties.”34 The court further noted that its prior opinion
affirming an unpublished opinion of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts in Iacobucci v. Boulter stood for the proposition that “the
videotaping of public officials is an exercise of First Amendment liber29. Id. at 82.
30. Id. It is critical to note that this somewhat amorphous right—to gather, disseminate and receive information—is drawn from the First Amendment’s guarantee of “freedom
of press.” Id. at 82; ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 2012). There is no distinction between the press rights of the institutional media and the speech rights of ordinary
citizens. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the freedom of the press is coextensive with
the rights afforded under the constitution to the general public and provides no special privileges to members of the professional media. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972)
(“It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally.”). In this
context, the point is significant, given that mobile devices with recording capability and the
advent of social media sites, like Facebook and YouTube, are, perhaps unwittingly, turning
individual members of the general population into “citizen journalists” and eroding the distinction between the professional class of reporters and the average person.
31. Glik, 655 F.3d at 82.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The court cited with favor Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 103536 (1991), in which the Court “recognized a core First Amendment interest in ‘the dissemination of information relating to alleged government misconduct.’” The court also favorably
cited Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) for the proposition that public
scrutiny of police “will have a salutary effect on the functioning of government more generally.” Gilk, 655 F.3d at 82-83.
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ties.”35 There, a “citizen journalist” initiated a § 1983 claim after his arrest
for refusing to heed a police officer’s demand to stop filming members of a
historic district commission in a hallway outside a public meeting.36 Although Iacobucci was decided largely on Fourth Amendment grounds, the
Glik court made much of dicta accompanying the denial of the officer’s
claim of qualified immunity.37 In so deciding, the First Circuit affirmed that
the journalist’s acts were “peaceful, not performed in derogation of any
law, and done in the exercise of his First Amendment rights.”38
The court offered the inescapable caveat that, like all First Amendment
rights, filming public police activity is subject to content-neutral and reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.39 The court stated it was not
necessary to probe the fringe of such permissible restrictions where Glik’s
exercise of protected activity fell so comfortably within the scope of constitutional protection.40 The court noted that Glik filmed police officers (i)
peacefully, (ii) in a public forum where First Amendment rights are most
robust, (iii) at a safe remove from the officers, and (iv) without molesting
the performance of their duties.41 Moving from constitutional pedagogue to
schoolroom scold, the court reminded that “police officers are expected to
endure significant burdens caused by citizens’ exercise of their First
Amendment rights,” and, therefore, “restraint . . . must be expected when
they are merely the subject of videotaping that memorializes, without impairing, their work in public spaces.”42

35. Glik, 655 F.3d at 83 (citing Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir.
1999)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The Court stated that its recognition of a First Amendment right to film
police officers in public accords with jurisprudence in other jurisdictions. Id. at 83 (citing
Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (recognizing the First
Amendment right to “record matters of public interest”)); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d
436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995); Demarest v. Athol/Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d
82, 94-95 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding it was “highly probable” that recordation of public official on the street outside his home was protected by the First Amendment); Channel 10, Inc.
v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634, 638 (D. Minn. 1972) (seizure of television camera at crime
scene held to be unlawful “prior restraint” under First Amendment); Connell v. Town of
Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465, 471-72 (D.N.H. 1990) (rejecting the police chief’s assertion of
qualified immunity from § 1983 claim for preventing freelance photographer from taking
pictures of accident scene).
39. Glik, 655 F.3d at 84. See generally Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941) (holding government cannot regulate content of speech without infringing the First
Amendment but may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions).
40. Glik, 655 F.3d at 84.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Qualified Immunity from § 1983 Civil Liability

Regarding the officers’ assertion of qualified immunity, the First Circuit readily determined that the First Amendment right violated by the officers was “clearly established.” Thus, the officers’ affirmative defense of
qualified immunity was rejected.43 The court, while noting that “the ‘clearly
established’ inquiry does ‘not require a case directly on point,’” concluded
that Iacobucci gave the officers fair warning that their particular conduct
was unconstitutional.44 Turning the relative paucity of case law on the subject to its advantage, the court—quite cleverly—observed that the “brevity”
of the discussion in other tangentially relevant court opinions “speaks to the
fundamental and virtually self-evident nature of the First Amendment’s
protection in this area.”45 The court distinguished arguably contrary persuasive authority from the Third Circuit in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle.46
There, the Third Circuit held that the right to film police officers in the administration of their public duties was not “clearly established,” however,
on a set of markedly distinct facts from Glik.47 For one, the § 1983 plaintiff,
Kelly, filmed the officer during a traffic stop in which he was a passenger
in the detained automobile.48 Second, he recorded the officer from a “video
camera in his lap . . . allegedly without [the officer’s] knowledge or consent.”49 In short, compared to Glik’s conspicuous recording in a public forum, Kelly’s recording was arguably clandestine and in the somewhat sui
generis context of a traffic stop of the camera operator.50 Echoing the same
point, the First Circuit concluded “Kelly is clearly distinguishable on its
facts; a traffic stop is worlds apart from an arrest on Boston Common in the
circumstances alleged.”51
43. Id. at 85.
44. Id. at 84.
45. Glik, 655 F.3d at 85.
46. Id.; See Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2010).
47. Glik, 655 F.3d at 85; Kelly, 622 F.3d at 251-52.
48. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 251-52.
49. Id. at 251. According to the facts recited by the Third Circuit, the recording was
almost certainly surreptitious. Id. at 251-52. At the end of the stop, the officer informed
Kelly that he was recording their conversation, as was Department policy, at which point he
claimed he “noticed” that Kelly was also recording the encounter on the device in his lap. Id.
50. Id. at 262.
51. Glik, 655 F.3d at 85. Glik also claimed that his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated because the officers lacked probable cause to effectuate his arrest. Id. at 86-87. The
Court held that, indeed, the officers lacked the requisite probable cause. As stated, Massachusetts wiretap statute criminalizes “an interception . . . of any wire or oral communication,” and, in turn, “interception” is defined to mean “to secretly hear, secretly record the
contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any intercepting device by
any person other than a person given prior authority by all parties to the communication.”
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 99(B)(4) & (C)(1) (emphasis added). Likewise, the Massa-
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ACLU V. ALVAREZ

Where the Glik opinion was the first, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit’s ruling in ACLU v. Alvarez was the splashiest.52 In a splitdecision, the Seventh Circuit (over the dissent of the notable Judge Richard
A. Posner) enjoined, as violative of the First Amendment, enforcement of
the Illinois eavesdropping statute as applied to open audio recordings of
police officers in the performance of their public duties.53
1.

The Illinois Eavesdropping Statute

Prior to recitation of the court’s holding, it is critical to note—as the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged—that Illinois’s eavesdropping statute was
the most draconian in the nation and to place that designation in the proper
context.54 Every state except Vermont, as well as the U.S. Congress, has
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a recording is not “secret” within the definition
provided by the wiretap statute where the recorder “held the tape recorder in plain sight.”
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 971 (Mass. 2001). Cf. Commonwealth v. Rivera,
833 N.E.2d 113, 125 (Mass. 2005) (stating the defendant’s unawareness of security cameras
did not render recording “secret” where cameras were “in plain sight”). In Glik, from the
face of the facts alleged in the criminal complaint no less, the officers admitted Glik was
“openly recording them” and, what’s more, acknowledged their actual notice of his recording by the statement of one of the officers that Glik had “taken enough pictures.” Glik, 655
F.3d at 87. The Court stated that it was of no consequence that cell phones could be used for
other functions aside from audio recording, such as traditional photography, holding that no
affirmative evidence is needed that a device held in plain sight is capable of audio recording.
Id. at 88. The Court was clear that a “recording made with a device known to record audio
and held in plain view” is demonstrably not “secret.” Id. Holding that the absence of probable cause was not even arguable, the Court concluded Glik’s Fourth Amendment rights were
“clearly established,” thus depriving the officers of qualified immunity on the Fourth
Amendment claim. Id.
52. See generally ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). The decision
received significant media coverage. See, e.g., Jason Keyser, Court Strikes Blow To Illinois
Eavesdropping
Law,
THE
ASSOC.
PRESS,
May
8,
2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/09/court-strikes-blow-to-ill_0_n_1502475.html;
Illinois Eavesdropping Law Reversed: Court Sides With ACLU Over Police Recordings, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, May 9, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/09/illinoiseavesdropping-la_n_1500272.html.
53. See generally Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 583.
54. Id. at 595 n.4, (citing Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?
The Need for Safeguards in State Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to
Record Public Police Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 487, 533-45 (2011)). Illinois’s statute
is the only statute in the country that prohibits recording of police officers without all-party
consent even when (i) the recording is open, and (ii) the officers’ lack a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 489-96 & app. 1 (collecting state statutes). While Oregon’s statute also
prohibits open recording of police, even when there exists no reasonable expectation of
privacy, the Oregon counterpart provides an exemption for “unconcealed” recordings at
“public events” or when the recorded parties are informed that they are being recorded. Id.
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adopted a statute criminalizing some forms of nonconsensual interception
of oral communications by use of electronic recording devices.55 Emerging
decades before the digital era, these are referred to by the antiquated, yet
enduring, label “wiretapping” statutes because of the physical line that had
to be intercepted to record conversations before videotape, digital cameras,
and smartphones.56 The various state laws and their federal counterpart often depart from the other one based on three critical distinctions:
(1) whether criminal punishment requires a surreptitious or
otherwise concealed recording or whether open recording
is still prohibited;
(2) whether the consent of one party to the conversation,
typically the recording party, insulates the recorder from
criminal liability, or whether the interception remains illicit
absent the consent of all parties to the communication; and
(3) whether the statute’s penalties apply when the party
recorded owns no “reasonable expectation of privacy . . .
.”57
Most statutes mirror the federal statute, Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), which is a one-party consent statute that only criminalizes interception where the recorded party
objectively owns a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”58 Therefore, most
The Oregon law, while by no means exemplary, provides escape hatches clearly unavailable
in the Illinois eavesdropping statute. See id.
55. Alderman, supra note 54, at 489-96 & app. 1.
56. See id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 99 (2008).
57. Alderman, supra note 54, at 489-96 & app. 1. In Katz v. United States, in a
concurring opinion eclipsing even the majority’s watershed ruling that individuals own a
personal privacy right in the contents of conversations that they shelter from public inspection, Justice Harlan introduced the enduring principle of a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52, 361 (1967). The concurrence established a
two-tiered test for constitutional protection of personal conversations under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The test required “first that a person have
exhibited an actual [subjective] expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id. It has been said that Justice
Harlan’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is the “touchstone” of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Cal. v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“The touchstone of Fourth
Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’”). For a broader conversation on the origins and applications of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” doctrine and its applicability to public police activity, see
Alderman, supra note 54, at 489-519.
58. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2008)). Title III criminalizes “interception” of an “oral communication,” and defines “oral communication” as a statement “uttered
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state statutes, like Title III, do not collide with an individual First Amendment right to record police in the public performance of their duties.59 First,
the consent of the recorder draws the act outside the scope of proscribed
activity. As such, if the recorder is a party to the conversation, and not a
third party observer, recordation is permissible. Second, it is well settled, if
not axiomatic, that police do not own an objective expectation of privacy in
the exercise of their official duties in the public sphere; therefore, in most
cases, these laws protect the recordation rights at issue in this Article.60 On
the other side of the conversation, in Lopez v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that a civilian’s statements to law enforcement agents typically
lack a reasonable expectation of privacy because agents could repeat them
or testify to them later.61
However, there are a handful of state laws that depart from this majority construct.62 Massachusetts, where Simon Glik was arrested, is a notable
exception, (i) prohibiting recordation even where the parties do not own a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the communication, and (ii) requiring
all-party consent.63 Illinois, unlike Massachusetts, goes a step further by
punishing (as a felony no less) (i) both secret and open recording, (ii) without all-party consent, and (iii) regardless of whether the recorded party
owns a reasonable expectation of privacy.64 Thus, the statute’s criminal
by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception
in circumstances justifying such expectation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2008).
59. See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 n.4; (7th Cir. 2012); Alderman, supra
note 54, at 489-511 & app. 1.
60. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437-39 (1963); Beckamer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984) (“[T]he typical traffic stop is public.”); Hornberger v. Am.
Broad Co., 799 A.2d 566, 595 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2002) (stating police officers qua
police officers lack reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations made within earshot
of suspects or civilians and do not possess “personal privacy interests” public performance
of their duties). See also Commonwealth v. Henlen, 564 A.2d 905, 906-07 (Pa. 1989); Alderman, supra note 54, at 514-19.
61. Lopez, 373 U.S. at 437-39.
62. See Alderman, supra note 54, at 489-96 & app. 1 (discussing states that criminalize various recordings of police fulfilling their public duties).
63. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 99(B)(4); Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d
963, 967 (Mass. 2001) (holding the wiretap statute extends protection from non-consensual,
surreptitious recording to all “members of the public, including . . . police officers or other
public officials interacting with members of the public”).
64. Generally, the statute makes it a class 4 felony to use an “eavesdropping device”
to record “all or any part of any conversation” unless all parties to the conversation give their
consent. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/14-2(a)(1) (Sate Bar Edition 2012). The statute defines
the term “conversation” as “any oral communication between 2 or more persons regardless
of whether one or more of the parties intended their communication to be of a private nature
under circumstances justifying that expectation.” Id. at § 5/14-1(d). The operative definition
of eavesdropping device is “any device capable of being used to hear or record oral conversation,” even if the conversation takes place face-to-face. Id. at § 5/14-(1)(a).
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penalties, without exception, reach any civilian who records public police
activity without prior consent of the officer.65 In contrast to Massachusetts,
where constructive notice in the form of “plain sight” recording conclusively establishes that the recording is not within the ambit of the statute’s prohibition on “secret” recording, Illinois proscribes any recording absent affirmative evidence of “surrounding circumstances indicating that the party
knowingly agreed to the surveillance.”66 Somewhat remarkably, the statute
elevates the offense to a class 1 felony—with a possible prison term of four
to fifteen years—if any of the recorded parties is performing duties as a law
enforcement officer.67 This, in the magnanimous words of the Seventh Circuit, makes Illinois’s statute “the broadest of its kind.”68
2.

The ACLU “Test Case”

In Alvarez, the ACLU floated its challenge as a clear “test case.”69 The
organization filed suit pursuant to § 1983 against Anita Alvarez, the State’s
Attorney for Cook County, which includes Chicago—Illinois’s most populous city.70 The ACLU sought declaratory and injunctive relief, enjoining
enforcement of the eavesdropping statute against participants in the organization’s “police accountability program.”71 Under that prospective program,
the ACLU averred that volunteers endeavored to record police without their
consent (i) in the performance of their public duties, (ii) in public places,
(iii) when “the officers are speaking at a volume audible to the unassisted
human ear,” and (iv) “where the manner of recording is otherwise lawful.”72
The ACLU argued that the accountability program was protected by the
First Amendment but nonetheless prohibited by the eavesdropping statute.73
The State’s Attorney filed a motion to dismiss contending that the
ACLU lacked standing and failed to state a violation of the First Amendment.74 The district court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that
65. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 608. (7th Cir. 2012).
66. Id.; People v. Ceja, 789 N.E.2d 1228, 1241 (Ill. 2003).
67. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/14-4(b) (State Bar Edition 2012). In a startling asymmetry, the statute carves out exceptions for police who intercept communications in a wide
array of public encounters, including “traffic stops” and “requests for identification.” Id. at §
5/14-3(h).
68. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595 n.4.
69. Id. at 586.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 588.
73. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 588.
74. Id. Initially, the district court ordered dismissal without prejudice, holding that
the ACLU lacked standing because it did not adequately allege a credible fear of prosecution. Id. at 591. The ACLU cured the jurisdictional defect by filing an amended complaint,
adding as named plaintiffs ACLU employees that would be involved in the recording of
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“[t]he ACLU has not alleged a cognizable First Amendment injury” because the “right to audio record” is not protected speech within the shelter
of the First Amendment.75 Apparently, without awareness of the unbroken
line of cases articulating clear protection for the right to gather and receive
information under the “press” clause of the First Amendment, the court
characterized the ACLU’s claim as “an unprecedented expansion of the
First Amendment.”76 Since, in the district court’s view, the ACLU alleged
no injury-in-fact, it ruled that the group lacked standing to sue.77
officers and providing more detail about the threat of prosecution. Id. On appeal, the State’s
Attorney argued again that the ACLU’s amended complaint still did not raise a credible
threat of prosecution. Id. at 592. The Seventh Circuit snuffed this argument, pointing out that
(i) the statute incontrovertibly precludes the ACLU’s proposed activity, and (ii) prosecutors,
including those in Ms. Alvarez’s office, brought no fewer than twelve criminal cases against
defendants for allegedly filming police in public. Id. at 592-93 & n.2. The Cook County
prosecutions identified by the court were: “People v. Drew, No. 10-cr-46 (Cook Cnty., Ill.,
Cir. Ct.), People v. Moore, No. 10-cr-15709 (Cook Cnty., Ill., Cir. Ct.), and People v. Tate,
No. 11-cr-9515 (Cook Cnty., Ill., Cir. Ct.),” and the others were: “People v. Thompson, No.
04-cf-1609 (6th Cir., Champaign Cnty., Ill.); People v. Wight, No. 05-cf-2454 (17th Cir.,
Winnebago Cnty., Ill.); People v. Babarskas, No. 06-cf-537 (12th Cir., Will Cnty., Ill.);
People v. Allison, No. 09-cf-50 (2d Cir., Crawford Cnty., Ill.); People v. Parteet, No. 10-cf49 (16th Cir., DeKalb Cnty., Ill.); People v. Biddle, No. 10-cf-421 (16th Cir., Kane Cnty.,
Ill.); People v. Fitzpatrick, No. 10-cf-397 (5th Cir., Vermillion Cnty., Ill.); People v. Lee,
No. 08-cf-1791 (12th Cir., Will Cnty., Ill.); and People v. Gordon, No. 10-cf-341 (11th Cir.,
Livingston Cnty., Ill.).”; Id. at 593 n. 2.2.
75. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 589, 591.
76. Id. at 589.
77. Id. The well-settled standard for Article III standing requires a plaintiff in federal court to meet the burden of showing “he is [i] under threat of suffering ‘injury in fact’ that
is concrete and particularized; [ii] the threat must be actual and imminent, not concrete or
hypothetical; [iii] it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and
[iv] it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.” Id.
at 590 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)). The majority
disagreed with the lower court judge’s conclusion that the ACLU failed to allege a recognizable injury. Id. at 591-93. Dissecting her rationale, the court discovered that she relied on
a thin reed of dicta in Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106, 1111 (7th Cir. 1997), wherein the court stated, “there is nothing in the Constitution which guarantees the right to record
a public event” in denying the challenge of an onlooker denied entry to a Ku Klux Klan rally
because his video camera fit within a police ban on objects that could be used as a “weapon
or projectile.” Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 591-93. The judge, however, overlooked the court’s
immediately subsequent statement, explaining that, though the weapons ban implicated
protected First Amendment interests, “[t]he right to gather information may be limited under
. . . valid time, place, or manner regulation.” Id. at 591-92. The judge’s conflation of a permissible time, place, and manner restriction for a categorical rule that “audiovisual recording
is wholly unprotected,” exemplified a shocking dereliction of elementary First Amendment
principles. Id. at 592. See also id. at 595 (“Audio and audiovisual recording are media of
expression commonly used for the preservation and dissemination of information and ideas
and thus are ‘included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’” (quoting Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952))).
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The First Amendment

A two-judge majority of a Seventh Circuit panel—Judges Diane Sykes
and David Hamilton—disagreed with the district court.78 In an unmistakable rebuke, the court chided the State’s Attorney’s “extreme position” that
“openly recording what police officers say while performing their duties in
traditional public fora—streets, sidewalks, plazas, and parks—is wholly
unprotected by the First Amendment.”79 The court held that the “expansive
reach” of Illinois’s statute cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment’s
protection of any “medium of expression” used to “gather and disseminate
information.”80
i.

The Right to Gather, Disseminate, and Receive Information

Like the First Circuit before it, the gravamen of the Alvarez court’s
holding is that audiovisual recording of police in public infringes the protected First Amendment interest of the public to gather and disseminate
information and concomitantly to receive such information and facilitate
engagement in matters of democratic importance.81 Unlike the First Circuit,
the Seventh Circuit supports its holding with a lengthy exegesis, replete
with insightful analysis of precedent and a somewhat supererogatory attempt at divination of the amendment’s original intent.82 To begin, the court
short-circuited the speech-conduct dichotomy that would parse the “making” of an audiovisual recording as an unprotected “act,” insufficiently
tinged with a modus operandi of “expression.”83 The court wrote:
The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included within the First Amendment’s guarantee
of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording. The right to publish or
broadcast an audio or audiovisual recording would be insecure, or largely ineffective, if the antecedent act of making
78. Id. at 585.
79. Id. at 594.
80. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 586, 595, 601.
81. Id. at 595-96. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 191 (1983).
82. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 599-600. The court examined several texts, finding inter
alia that prominent Whig commentators believed the First Amendment ensured “all honest
Magistrates . . . have their Deeds openly examined, and publicly scann’d” and colonial writers exhorted the “right of the people to be informed of their governors’ conduct so as to
shape their own judgments on ‘Public Matters’ and be qualified to choose their representatives.” Id. (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 595-96.
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the recording is wholly unprotected . . . By way of simple
analogy, banning photography or note-taking at a public
event would raise serious First Amendment concerns . . .
Put differently, the eavesdropping statute operates at the
front end of the speech process by restricting the use of a
common, indeed ubiquitous, instrument of communication.
Restricting the use of an audio or audiovisual recording device suppresses the speech just as effectively as restricting
the dissemination of the resulting recording.84
Next, the majority placed in proportion the magnitude of the First
Amendment interests imperiled by the eavesdropping statute.85 The court
stressed that the statute compromised “‘our profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open.’”86 Like the First Circuit, the court cautioned that the First
Amendment “goes beyond protection of the press and self-expression of
individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information
from which members of the public may draw.”87 At bottom, the court summarized the First Amendment interest at stake as “gathering news and information . . . about the affairs of government”—a cardinal purpose recognized throughout First Amendment jurisprudence.88
84. Id. (emphasis supplied). In an analogy incongruously equating the merit of
documenting the acts of public officials performing their duties—noble or nefarious—with
the merit of corporate spending on electioneering as controversially extended First Amendment protection by the Supreme Court, the majority argued that the same reasoning supporting campaign-finance jurisprudence applies to recording police. Id. (“The [Supreme] Court
held long ago that campaign-finance regulations implicate core First Amendment interests
because raising and spending money facilitates the resulting political speech.”). See Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2011).
85. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 602. The court wrote: “[I]t should be clear now that [the
statute’s] effect on First Amendment interests is far from incidental . . . The law’s legal
sanction is directly leveled against the expressive element of an expressive activity.” Id. at
602-03.
86. Id. at 597 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
87. Id. (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978));
see Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011).
88. Id. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“Nor is it suggested that
news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection, without some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of press could be eviscerated.”). The Seventh Circuit also
acknowledged the Branzburg Court’s instruction that the “institutional press ‘has no special
immunity from the application of general laws.’” Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 598 (quoting Ass’d
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)). The Seventh Circuit also addressed the
Branzburg Court’s caveat that an expansive judicially administered right to gather information would “present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order” but found the
express statement that the right to gather information was deserving of “some protection” to
be of paramount importance. Id. (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 703-04).
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ii. Intermediate Scrutiny
Having framed the issue as one within the compass of the First
Amendment, the Alvarez court endeavored to assign the level of scrutiny to
apply to the statute. The inquiry turned on the familiar proposition that
“content-based” regulations are subject to “strict scrutiny,” whereas “content-neutral” legislation receives the more deferential standard of “intermediate scrutiny.”89 The ACLU argued that the statute is content-based because it discriminates among speakers by allowing—without a search warrant or some lesser approval by a neutral magistrate—uniformed police
officers to record civilians in a broad variety of encounters, while imposing
an absolute ban on civilian recordation of those same conversations.90 The
argument relies on the “preferred speaker” doctrine, which forbids government from “taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others . . .
.”91 The court found the doctrine inapposite, however, stating that it only
applies “when the government discriminates among private speakers, not
when it facilitates its own speech.”92 In the end, the majority only offered
that it was inclined to conclude that the Illinois eavesdropping statute was
content-neutral, without definitively resolving the matter.93 The court stated, however, that regardless of the content-neutral status, the challenged
provisions of the statute would fail even intermediate scrutiny as applied to
the ACLU’s accountability program.94
As a threshold matter, the court had to settle among several formulations of the intermediate scrutiny test in free-speech cases.95 After analyzing
the standard applied by the Seventh Circuit in various contexts, including
commercial speech and speech-forum challenges, the court enumerated the
essential elements of intermediate scrutiny: “(1) content neutrality . . . [;]
(2) an important public-interest justification for the challenged regulation;
89. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 603-04. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
642 (1994) (stating laws “that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon
speech because of its content” are subject to strict scrutiny, whereas “regulations that are
unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny because in
most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the
public dialogue.”) (citation omitted).
90. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 603-04.
91. Id. (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2011)).
92. Id. at 604. The majority expressed concern with the statute’s exemption for live
broadcasts “by radio, television, or otherwise,” which appears to subordinate some private
speakers in preference for others, while also violating the principle that the institutional press
is accorded no special entitlements. Id. at 588. However, it declined to address the issue
because it was not at issue in the ACLU’s challenge. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 604. For criticism of the application of the more lenient intermediate scrutiny standard in lieu of strict scrutiny, see infra notes 220-253 and accompanying text.
95. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 604-05.
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and (3) a reasonably close fit between the law’s means and its ends.” This
last element requires “that the burden on the First Amendment rights must
not be greater than necessary to further the important governmental interest
at stake.”96
Addressing the second prong, the court analyzed the public-interest
justification for the eavesdropping statute.97 The objective proffered by the
State’s Attorney was the protection of “conversational privacy.”98 The court
noted that “the protection of personal conversational privacy serves First
Amendment interests” because fear of disclosure would have a chilling
effect on private conversations.99 However, the court rightfully observed
that there were no privacy interests of constitutional dimension involved in
the challenge.100 The court borrowed from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to expose the fallacy of the purported “privacy” interest.101 The court
explained that with regard to the species of communications sought to be
recorded by the ACLU (open recordation of “official” conversations spoken
at an audible volume), the parties lacked any “reasonable expectation of
privacy.”102 As noted by Justice Harlan’s seminal concurrence in Katz v.
United States, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”103
The State’s Attorney offered three other phlegmatic justifications for
the eavesdropping statute’s ban: “to [1] encourage that civilians candidly
speak with law enforcement, including those conversations conditioned on
confidentiality; [2] limit opportunities of the general public from gaining
access to matters of national and local security; and [3] reduce the likelihood of provoking persons during officers’ mercurial encounters.”104 The
Seventh Circuit surgically dismissed these putative justifications.105 The
court emphasized again that the statute ensnares communications within
“earshot” of the public, in no way chilling confidential police conversations, which can occur in a secure location protected from snoops and recorders by legitimate trespass and property laws.106 Likewise, matters of
national or local security would not be trumpeted at audible decibels for
96. Id. at 605.
97. Id. at 605-06.
98. Id. at 605.
99. Id. at 605.
100. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 605-07.
101. Id.
102. Id.; See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
103. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; see supra notes 57-60 and
accompanying text.
104. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607.
105. Id. at 607-08.
106. Id.
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bystanders to hear, and if they were, they certainly are not deserving of, or
would necessarily lose, their sensitive character.107 Lastly, the court stated
that invalidation of the eavesdropping statute as applied to filming police in
public in no manner “immunizes behavior that obstructs or interferes with
effective law enforcement or the protection of public safety.”108 The panoply of disturbing-the-peace and obstruction-of-justice-type offenses, to say
nothing of trespassing and harassment laws, is available to restrain those
who, in connection with recording, physically interfere with an arrest or
other police operation.109
Moving to the third prong of intermediate scrutiny, the majority, noting that the Illinois legislature is entitled to draft legislation that protects
conversational privacy above the floor provided by the Fourth Amendment,
nonetheless concluded that by criminalizing recordation of any conversation—without limiting the statute’s reach to those conversations bearing
indicia of privacy—“the State has severed the link between the eavesdropping statute’s means and its end.”110 Likewise, the court further praised the
unique First Amendment value of recording at issue, writing: “audio and
audiovisual recording are uniquely reliable and powerful methods of preserving and disseminating news and information about events that occur in
public. Their self-authenticating character makes it highly unlikely that
other methods could be considered reasonably adequate substitutes.”111 The
statute thus evinces no tailoring to its supposed purpose where it punishes
audio recording that does not implicate a cognizable privacy interest.112 As
a result, the majority reversed and remanded the decision of the district
court with instructions to,
enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the State’s Attorney from applying the Illinois eavesdropping statute
against the ACLU and its employees or agents who openly
audio record the audible communications of lawenforcement officers (or others whose communications are
incidentally captured) when the officers are engaged in
their official duties in public places . . . .113

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id.
See id.
See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 607.
Id.
Id. at 608.
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As a postscript, on November 26, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the
State’s Attorney’s petition for certiorari114
iii. Judge Posner’s Dissent in Alvarez
While Judge Richard A. Posner is often acknowledged as one of the
country’s most brilliant and intellectually curious jurists, a discerning reader would be excused for finding his dissent in Alvarez short of that measure.115 Judge Posner began by parsing the right at issue in the case, not as
one of “freedom of speech” generally but “more precisely, freedom to publish or otherwise disseminate other people’s speech.”116
Judge Posner’s first substantive argument appears to arise from a
vague concern for judicial comity, even where, as here, constitutional rights
are implicated.117 He wrote:
[o]ur ruling casts a shadow over electronic privacy statutes
of other states as well, to the extent that they can be interpreted to require the consent of at least one party to a conversation to record it even though the conversation takes
place that in a public place [sic], if the conversation could
nevertheless reasonably be thought private by the parties.118
By way of example, Judge Posner applied the majority’s interpretation to
California’s wiretapping statute that, like a supermajority of states not including Illinois, provides an exception to all-party consent where the parties
may “reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded.”119 He then surmised that “[t]o read the statute literally would exclude all private communications because any private conversation can be
overheard and recorded, even if it is a conversation in a closed room.” 120
Therefore, he determined that the majority’s conferral of a right to film
officers in the public performance of their official duties is so broad that it
could invalidate statutes, such as California’s, that extend protection to ob-

114. Tal Kopen, Supreme Court Won’t Hear Police Recording Case, POLITICO (Nov.
26, 2012), available at http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2012/11/supremecourt-wont-hear-police-recording-case-150290.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
115. See, e.g., Larissa MacFarquhar, The Bench Burner, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 10,
2010, at 78, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2001/12/10/011210fa_fact_macfarquhar
(mostly laudatory profile of judge portrayed as prolific, conservative, but also iconoclastic).
116. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 608 (Posner, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 609.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.

2013]

BEFORE YOU PRESS RECORD

505

jectively “private” conversations.121 To illustrate his alarm, he resorted to a
tactic of reductio ad absurdum, expressing deep concern for the civilian
speaking to a police officer on a sidewalk “in a low voice” or in a closed
room susceptible to sophisticated eavesdropping equipment.122
Next, Judge Posner ping-ponged his understanding of the original
scope of the First Amendment, which is strikingly limited and divorced
from the deep well of modern jurisprudence.123 He argued, without citation,
that the architects of the Bill of Rights only intended the First Amendment
to preclude prior restraint, not subsequent criminal prosecution for exercising speech rights: “The relevant provision . . . merely forbids Congress to
abridge free speech, which as understood in the eighteenth century means
freedom only from censorship (that is, suppressing speech, rather than just
punishing the speaker after the fact).”124
One of Judge Posner’s more robust arguments was that the majority’s
ruling could imperil the common law constellation of “invasion of privacy”
torts.125 He wrote:
A person who is talking with a police officer on duty may
be a suspect whom the officer wants to question; he may be
a bystander whom the police are shooing away from the
scene of a crime or an accident; he may be an injured person seeking help; he may be a crime victim seeking police
intervention; he may be asking for directions; he may be
arguing with a police officer over a parking ticket; he may
be reporting a traffic accident. In many of these encounters
the person conversing with the police officer may be very
averse to the conversations being broadcast on the evening
news or blogged throughout the world. In some instances
such publicity would violate the tort right of privacy, a
conventional exception to freedom of speech as I have noted. This body of law is endangered by today’s ruling.126
Moving to another line of dissent, Judge Posner argued that the majority’s opinion “may cause state and federal judicial dockets . . . to swell
because it will unwittingly encourage police officers to shoo away bystanders . . .” newly emboldened to record their every observation of officers.127
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 609-10 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id. at 610.
Id. at 610-11.
Id. at 610.
Id.
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 611 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id. at 612.
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Judge Posner pontificated that this will cause police to “freeze” during their
duties and inhibit officers from extracting information and communicating
effectively “in the line of duty.”128 However implausible, he provided the
hypothetical example of an informant trying to provide information to an
officer while inhibited by the recording of a journalist who persistently
places himself within earshot.129 Thus, Judge Posner warned that the majority has endangered public safety.130
Magnifying his “Chicken Little” tactics to society writ large, Judge
Posner returned to his forceful advocacy for “private talk in public places.”131 He argued that publication of conversations intended by ordinary
citizens to be private, whether or not occurring in public with a police officer on duty, will chill conversational freedom and spontaneity. However,
he did not dispute that police “may have no right to privacy in carrying out
official duties in public.”132 But, he argued, “the civilians they interact with
do[,]” and it is these hypothetical masses whose commensurate rights are
infringed by lawful recordation of police.133 Turning somber, the judge,
along the same analytical lines, argued the majority’s decision “gives passersby the right to memorialize and publicize (on Facebook, on Twitter, on
YouTube, on a blog)” the “agonized plea for help[]” of a rape or shooting
victim.134 Taken as whole, he concluded that such a reading of the First
Amendment has too “baleful” an effect on the conversational privacy and
that the Illinois eavesdropping statute therefore satisfies constitutional inspection.135
III.

Unanswered Questions

This Section raises four distinct questions that remain unsettled in the
aftermath of Glik and Alvarez. These are discussed in turn.
A.

WILL OTHER COURTS BE PERSUADED BY JUDGE POSNER’S DISSENT?

As of 2013, only the First and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have
established a First Amendment liberty to openly record police officers in
the public performance of their official duties.136 Put differently, what the
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
Cir. 2011).

Id. at 611.
Id. at 613.
Id.
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 613 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 614.
Id.
Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (majority opinion); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st
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Constitution now protects in Indiana, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Maine
remains potentially vulnerable to an adverse ruling in Iowa, Idaho, Michigan, and Mississippi. As similar cases reach the bench in other jurisdictions,
or the U.S. Supreme Court, which will hold the most persuasive currency:
the majority interpretation in Glik and Alvarez or Judge Posner’s dissenting
argument? Judge Posner’s gravitas may attract jurists to springboard off the
kernels of legal argument in his short dissent.137 However, a more likely
outcome is that Judge Posner’s dissent will be roundly ignored, and courts
confronting this issue of first impression will be persuaded by the sound
persuasive reasoning of the Glik and Alvarez majorities. For the reasons that
follow, it seems probable that other courts will agree that Judge Posner’s
dissent is too thinly reasoned, too analytically inconsistent, and too divorced from longstanding First Amendment jurisprudence to be persuasive.
1.

The Right is Not Placed in a Recognized Constitutional Framework

Read as a whole, Judge Posner’s dissent suffers from a failure to tether
his dissatisfaction with the outcome to any recognized legal framework. 138
Rather than defining the right at issue in the ACLU’s challenge and applying the appropriate standard of review, whether it be rational basis, intermediate or strict scrutiny, or some other cognizable balancing calculus,
Judge Posner’s dissent reads like a diary of loosely associated musings.139
As discussed below, Judge Posner devoted one sentence to defining—
incorrectly—the right imperiled by the eavesdropping statute but declines
to address which test of constitutionality should be imposed or to apply any
such test.140 By the judge’s formulation, enjoining the eavesdropping statute, even in the narrow circumstances of the case, would have too chilling
137. See MacFarquhar, supra note 115.
138. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 608-14 (Posner, J., dissenting). Not all speech—or
infringement thereof—is created equal in First Amendment jurisprudence, with different
standards applying to different categories of speech, while even certain narrow categories of
speech are unprotected. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minnesota. v. White, 536 U.S. 765
(2002) (speech rights of political candidates); Virginia. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1974) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speech that
incites violence); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (expressive conduct); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (press rights); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (prior restraint). The majority placed the right at issue within the press clause of the First Amendment’s protection of the right to gather and disseminate information and denominated the
Illinois eavesdropping statute as a content-neutral ban on such speech deserving of intermediate scrutiny. Alvarez, 679 F. 3d at 594-96. Judge Posner makes little attempt to define that
right at issue and apply a cognizable form of constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 608-14.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 608.

508

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

an effect on the privacy not of the officer but of civilian conversants.141 If
the judge has decided to subordinate all other inquiry and has determined
that protecting conversational privacy is a “rational basis” to uphold the
statute, he did not state as much.142 Nor did he justify why the alleged infringement of the right to record matters of public import should merit this
lesser “rational basis” degree of scrutiny reserved for laws that do collide
with constitutionally protected values.143
2.

The First Amendment Protects More Than Prior Restraint

Perhaps his dissent applied no accepted test for the constitutionality of
a statute because the judge sees no constitutional collision at all.144 In framing the issue, he did posit that the First Amendment only protects citizens
from prior restraint.145 While this has been demonstrably rejected by the
entire canon of First Amendment law, Judge Posner nonetheless declined to
141. Id. at 613.
142. Id. at 608-14. Nor does Judge Posner place the “conversational privacy” of
citizens (which is incidentally captured by recording of police) in a constitutional framework. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 608-14 (Posner, J., dissenting). He does not state whether this
privacy interest is protected by the Fourth Amendment or, as “conversation,” the First
Amendment. Id. He simply states that the governmental objectives proffered by the State’s
Attorney have “social value.” Id. at 614.
143. Id. at 608-14. Putting aside the procedural incompleteness of his dissent, First
Amendment jurisprudence is rife with examples where the protected activity of one person
has an ancillary (and adverse) effect on others, whether it be their constitutional right to
privacy, their concomitant right to speak, or merely “social values.” Without balancing the
constitutional values in a recognized form of judicial review under the principles of stare
decisis, Judge Posner’s dissent seems to suggest that a court balancing a constitutional right
against competing “social values” served by extinguishing that right is determinative. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 614. By this reasoning, the Ku Klux Klan must be criminally punished for
espousing their worldview because society places little value in their message, and their
conduct is deeply offensive to the majority. So too may corporations face prohibition of
speech advocating their preferred political candidates because the vast resources they can
devote to their message has a socially deleterious effect on the related ability of individuals
to publicize their political speech. More to the point of conversational privacy, under Justice
Posner’s interpretation, newspapers could face daily arrest when any given article publishes
third-party statements that an individual had subjectively hoped to keep “private.” All of
these are “rationally based” results in a simple “social value” balancing, yet all of these
results are demonstrably unconstitutional. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898
(2003) (declaring First Amendment right of corporations to contribute unrestricted amounts
of donations to political candidates); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534-35 (2001)
(upholding right of press to publish conversations lawfully obtained by publisher, but unlawfully obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in the first instance); Brandenburg, 395
U.S. at 444 (holding that Ku Klux Klan speech cannot be proscribed unless it incites imminent violence).
144. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 610-11 (Posner, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
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even apply his own test.146 Certainly, if the ACLU is protected from prior
restraint, the eavesdropping statute should be reviewed to ensure that it does
not, in fact, impose such a restraint.147 At least a non-frivolous argument
could be made that it does and that Justice Posner’s declaration that a pattern of subsequent punishment cannot amount to a “prior restraint” contradicts various Supreme Court authority.148 In short, the dissent fails for refusing to apply any standard of review. More fatally, the analysis is so divorced from longstanding precedent—and the principle of stare decisis,
which impels the court to apply heightened scrutiny to any law that impairs
the right to gather, disseminate, and receive information—that stands in
sharp contrast to the judge’s unsubstantiated and bare interpretation of the
First Amendment.149 In light of these jurisprudential flaws, Judge Posner
certainly has contributed meaningful commentary to the debate but not persuasive authority that future courts can rely upon without disrupting decades of First Amendment jurisprudence.150
3.

The Right at Issue is Imprecisely Defined and Analyzed

A survey of Judge Posner’s specific arguments reveals further flaws.
To begin, he misstated the right at issue, characterizing it not as “freedom
of speech” but “more precisely, freedom to publish or otherwise disseminate other people’s speech.”151 In fact, the judge’s description is less precise
because he put at issue more than the facts on hand in the ACLU’s challenge.152 The ACLU, in its complaint and briefing papers, clearly delineated
the conduct that it argued was jeopardized by enforcement of the eavesdropping statute.153 The very deliberate proposal of its police accountability
program was to: “Openly audio record[] police officers without their consent when: (1) the officers are performing their public duties; (2) the officers are in public places; (3) the officers are speaking at a volume audible to
the unassisted human ear; and (4) the manner of recording is otherwise law-

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Potere, supra note 27, at 309-12. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104
(1940) (holding law that forbade “nearly every practicable, effective means” of communicating about labor disputes to be unconstitutional “prior restraint” even though designed to
create “subsequent punishment”).
149. Compare Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 610-11 (Posner, J., dissenting), with Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972); Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
150. See supra note 138.
151. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 608 (Posner, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 588.
153. Id.
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ful.” The ACLU will focus on policing in public forums during expressive
activities.154
The ACLU did not state that its purpose is to “publish or otherwise
disseminate” its recordings.155 While, of course, the Constitution protects
dissemination in equal measure (under the aegis of the “press clause”), the
right at issue in the case was the physical act of “recording.”156 The majority rightfully called this act of recording the “front end” of a process that
enables essential First Amendment rights (just as banning note-taking or
paint brushes would impair First Amendment rights).157 The majority is
correct, and its refusal to decouple the physical “act” of recording from its
significance under the “press” clause of the First Amendment is sound.158
Nonetheless, as Judge Posner should have pointed out, the physical act of
recording—regardless of its necessity to effectuate the core constitutional
function of dissemination of information—is not without its own First
Amendment significance.159 Even in isolation, the act of recording is expressive.160 And “expressive conduct”—an act, like burning a draft card that
is infused with elements of speech—is too of constitutional dimension and
deserving of at least heightened scrutiny.161 Recording a police officer
sends a message trained at deterrence.162 It says that the recorder disapproves of misconduct, as does society writ large, and refuses to countenance bad behavior.163 It speaks in favor of accountability just as a closed
circuit camera that is not rolling tape still communicates a message to putative shoplifters.164 The judge ignored this expressive conduct line of cases,
further distancing his dissent from First Amendment precedent.165
154. Id.
155. See id. at 608.
156. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 588.
157. Id. at 596.
158. Id.
159. O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 976 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, CJ.,
dissenting) (“[The public’s role as watchdog] cannot be performed if citizens must fear
criminal reprisals when they seek to hold government officials responsible by recording—
secretly recording on occasion—an interaction between a citizen and a police officer.”).
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. As for Judge Posner’s grave admonition that “[t]he invalidation of a statute on
constitutional grounds should be a rare and solemn judicial act, done with reluctance under
compulsion of clear binding precedent or clear constitutional language or . . . an overwhelming gut feeling, that the statute has intolerable consequences” ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d
583, 609 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting), a similar warning is conspicuously missing
from the judge’s recent opinion invalidating Illinois’s statute prohibiting the carrying of a
loaded gun outside of the home as violative of the Second Amendment. Moore v. Madigan,
702 F.3d 933 (2012).

2013]

4.

BEFORE YOU PRESS RECORD

511

The Dissent Admits the Eavesdropping Statute is Too Draconian and
Proposes an Unrealistic Exception

Even before offering support for the constitutionality of the statute,
Judge Posner began by arguing against himself, writing: “Maybe [the
eavesdropping statute is] too strict in forbidding nonconsensual recording
even when done in defense of self or others, as when the participant in a
conversation records it in order to create credible evidence of blackmail,
threats, other forms of extortion, or other unlawful activity as in Glik . . .
.”166 Putting aside that Simon Glik recorded officers making an arrest in a
public park—precisely the type of recording for which the ACLU credibly
feared prosecution in Illinois—the judge’s reasoning is wanting.167 Say an
ACLU member is barred from recording unless she satisfies one of these
exceptions proposed by Judge Posner. And, say an officer approaches her
and threatens arrest unless she pays a $50 bribe. Must she openly take out
her recording device and ask the officer to repeat himself so that she may
document this “credible evidence of blackmail”?168 Surely, as Judge Posner
would have it, she would be a lawbreaker had she recorded the officer before the proffer of a bribe illuminated his mal intent.169 Should the store
clerk be required to turn a security camera on only after percipiently witnessing an act of shoplifting? Likewise, the waiter who recorded presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s “47 percent” comments—one of the most
discussed events of the 2012 presidential campaign and a paradigmatic example of the salutary contribution to our national dialogue of unscripted
recordings of public officials—had no advance knowledge that his recordation would alter a presidential election.170 Nor did George Holliday
have prior warning that he would introduce police brutality into the national
consciousness—and with it, produce irreplaceable inculpatory evidence—
166. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 609 (Posner, J., dissenting).
167. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 588; Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84. (1st Cir. 2011).
168. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 609 (Posner, J., dissenting).
169. See id.
170. Romney “47 percent” Dubbed Best Quote of 2012, THE ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 10,
2012, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57558154/romney-47-percentdubbed-best-quote-of-2012/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). Presidential candidate Mitt Romney,
unknowingly recorded at a fundraiser on May 7, 2012 in Boca Raton, Florida, was captured
on video saying:
There are 47 percent of the people who will vote for [President Barack
Obama] no matter what . . . who are dependent upon government, who
believe that they are victims. . . . These are people who pay no income
tax. . . . and so my job is not to worry about those people. I’ll never convince them that they should take personal responsibility and care for
their lives.
Id.
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when he set up a camcorder on his balcony that would later capture the
beating of Rodney King.171 The memorialization of the unguarded actions
of public officials offers the public a rare glimpse into the truth of what is
being done in its name and with its money. Judge Posner’s narrow exception offers insufficient and impracticable protection of that precious right.
5.

A First Amendment Right to Record Police in Public Does Not Imperil
Statutes That Criminalize Recordation Conversations Where Both
Parties Own a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Getting to the substance of his argument, Judge Posner took us down
the proverbial slippery slope to argue that the majority’s police exception
will somehow swallow the rule (in most states) that protects parties from
eavesdropping unless they “reasonably expect that the communication may
be overhead or recorded.”172 He argued that the holding will not protect
conversations where “conversants reasonably assume that no one is listening.”173 The argument must fail. The judge puzzlingly conflated a subjective desire for privacy (“reasonably assume no one is listening”) with the
Supreme Court’s “reasonable expectation of privacy standard,” an objective
measure that turns on whether the parties’ expectation of privacy is one that
“society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”174 Moreover, nothing in
the Glik and Alvarez opinions immunized the recordation of private citizens
in circumstances proscribed even by the notably broad Illinois eavesdropping statute.175 The constitutional right in Alvarez was narrowly extended to
allow recordation and dissemination of “public officials performing their
official duties in public.”176 Nothing more. The judge’s concern for the viability of more appropriately constrained state statutes is unfounded.177
171. Joel Rubin, Andrew Blankstein & Scott Gold, Twenty Years After the Beating of
Rodney King, the LAPD is a Changed Operation, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/03/local/la-me-king-video-20110301.
172. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 609 (Posner, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 610.
174. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan’s concurrence established a two-tiered inquiry that determined “first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id.
175. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 588; Glik, 655 F.3d at 79, 84.
176. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 588; Glik, 655 F.3d at 79, 84.
177. The majority also noted that Justice Posner’s concern was for state statutes
markedly less expansive. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607-08. After calling the Illinois statute a
“national outlier,” the court explained that:
Most state electronic privacy statutes apply only to private conversations; that is, they contain (or are construed to include) an expectationof-privacy requirement that limits their scope to conversations that carry
a reasonable expectation of privacy. Others apply only to wiretapping,
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There is no Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy in the Contents of a
Conversation Between a Citizen and a Police Officer Acting in His Official Capacity

As a matter of law, the Fourth Amendment does not protect the conversations for which Judge Posner is so concerned.178 As the judge
acknowledged, police officers qua police officers do not own a personal
privacy expectation in their official acts under prevailing judicial interpretations.179 The value he elevated—above First Amendment principles—is the
conversational privacy of the citizen interacting with the officer.180 However, this privacy interest is not one of constitutional dimension. In the seminal Katz case, the Supreme Court stated flatly that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection.”181 In a case directly on point, Lopez v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that a civilian’s statements to a law
enforcement agent lacked reasonable expectation of privacy from interception because the agent could repeat them or testify to them later.182 The likelihood—and objective expectation—that a police communication will be
publicly reported dilutes the objective reasonableness of a privacy expectation.183 It is a mainstay of the police officer’s obligation to the public to
accurately document and report communications made in an official capacity, whether via a log of activity, an arrest report, an application for a search
warrant, or a status conference with other officers.184 Under open records
laws, these reports are almost universally available to the public and media,
as they are intended to serve as a medium of transparency.185 Moreover,
police routinely—in fact, frequently—testify in criminal trials as to the contents of conversations with the members of the public. Just as the Supreme
and some ban only surreptitious recording. Indeed, the California statute
discussed in the dissent is explicitly limited to ‘confidential’ communications, a term specifically defined to exclude the kind of communications at issue here. If the Illinois statute contained a similar limitation,
the link to the State’s privacy justification would be much stronger.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
178. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
179. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 613 (Posner, J., dissenting).
180. Id.
181. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
182. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 437-39 (1963). See also Wishart v.
McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (1st Cir. 1974) (“[t]he right of privacy . . . may be surrendered by public display.”).
183. See Lopez, 373 U.S. at 437-39; Katz, 373 U.S. at 351-52.
184. See Lopez, 373 U.S. at 437-39.
185. See Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 217 n.21 (5th Cir. 2001) (enumerating six nonexclusive factors to weigh subjective expectation of privacy which include, inter
alia, “the potential for the communications to be reported”).
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Court has held that a member of the public could not objectively expect to
send financial information to his bank without surrendering the privacy
right attached to that information, the exchange of information to an officer
for official police purposes is tantamount to a public disclosure.186 Judge
Posner is properly concerned for the social value of “privacy,” particularly
for those citizens bold enough to take the risk of cooperating in dangerous
police investigations or unfortunate enough to be the victims of crime.
However, the information provided in these conversations lacks constitutionally protected character; if the person is talking to an officer in an official capacity, the contents of the conversation must be reasonably expected
to be publicly disclosed by the officer at some point or in some manner. 187
As such, Glik and Alvarez do not collide with the Fourth Amendment. To
the extent that there is “social value” in keeping certain communications
with police private, a law that prohibits all recordation of such communications, without exception, sweeps too broad to withstand a tailoring analysis
under intermediate or strict scrutiny.188
7.

A Positive First Amendment Right to Record Public Police Activity
Does Not Jeopardize Arrests for Filming Police in Derogation of Other Laws

As Judge Posner strenuously protested, there is indeed “social value”
in keeping certain conversations with police private.189 While these conversations lack Fourth Amendment protection—because information willingly
shared with public authorities reasonably should be expected to be used in
subsequent public proceedings—there are manifold reasons why they sometimes should nonetheless remain “private.”190 Chief among these might be
protecting the identities of confidential informants, safeguarding the repugnant details of sexual crimes, and preserving the integrity of ongoing criminal investigations. However, it is simply not the case, as Judge Posner
wrongfully suggested, that affording a positive First Amendment liberty to
record citizen interactions with police in the exercise of their public duties
sacrifices the police’s ability to keep private sensitive information. The
186. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
187. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
188. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607-08 (7th Cir. 2012) That is not to say that
there are no laws that can infringe upon the time, place, and manner of the exercise of this
right or that everything shared with law enforcement is categorically public. Certainly, national security laws and laws protecting the secrecy of grand juries, for instance, are valid
and not in derogation of the Constitution, even though the First Amendment right to disseminate information of public importance is curtailed in these narrow circumstances.
189. Id. at 611.
190. See supra notes 178-87 and accompanying text.
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right defined by the Glik and Alvarez courts is qualified.191 Though the private character of the conversations are not endowed with superior—or for
that matter, any—Fourth Amendment rights, recorders of public police activity may not reach into private places in derogation of property, trespassing, and other laws intended to protect privacy and keep order in society.192
As the District Court judge stated in Glik, the exercise of this First Amendment right, like all First Amendment rights, must be “peaceful [and] not
performed in derogation of any law.”193 A recorder may not, as in Judge
Posner’s alarmist example about sophisticated bugging equipment, trespass
upon the possessory rights of the police departments.194 A recorder may not
invade the interior of a police cruiser or break-and-enter into a police station to exercise the right conferred by Glik and Alvarez.195 By way of analogy, while a newspaper has a right to gather and publish news, it may not
break into the police department to steal the information.196 The front-end
speech right is qualified, and privacy (as a social and law enforcement, not
constitutional matter) will be appropriately protected by the permissible
enforcement of property and other laws.
Lastly, a note about Judge Posner’s reliance on Justice Harlan’s poetic
defense of conversational privacy in United States v. White.197 Judge Posner
selectively quoted the venerable Justice Harlan, out of context, to argue that
allowing the unfettered recordation of police in the public performance of
their official duties “might well smother that spontaneity—reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious and defiant discourse—that liberates daily
life.”198 The argument and quotation in Justice Harlan’s dissent comes in
markedly different context, and Judge Posner’s rental of the evocative language is disingenuous.199 Justice Harlan’s dissent offered a defense of the
rights of private discourse to be free from official state eavesdropping.200
That is the exact converse of recordation of public police activity.201 Moreover, disclosure of the public and taxpayer-funded conduct of public servants in no way threatens the spontaneity, frivolity, and impetuousness of
private life that Justice Harlan rightfully warned was at peril by govern191. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607; Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011).
192. Glik, 655 F.3d at 83-84.
193. Id. at 83 (quoting Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1999)).
194. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 608-09 (Posner, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 607; Glik, 655 F.3d at 84.
196. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534-35 (2001).
197. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787-89 (1971).
198. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 612 (Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting White, 401 U.S. at
745, 787-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
199. White, 401 U.S. at 787-89.
200. Id.
201. See id.
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ment-bugging of ordinary citizens.202 The mechanical conversations of a
citizen and an officer on duty cannot be plausibly said to “liberate[] daily
life” with frivolity and defiance.203As throughout his dissent, Judge Posner
improperly cloaked public police activity in the “social value” attendant to
private-party conversations of a genuinely private character.204 Judge Posner’s reference to tamed spring breaks and the danger of web cams similarly conflated the relationship of society as a whole with eavesdropping in the
age of ubiquitous recording devices, with the limited—and salutary—right
to film police performing their official duties in public spaces.205
8.

The First Amendment Right Does Not Eliminate the Common Law
“Invasion of Privacy” Torts

Next, Judge Posner’s argument that the ruling threatens to eviscerate
the tort of invasion of privacy is puzzling.206 Invasion of privacy is actually
an umbrella term that encompasses a variety of common law tort actions,
many of which are no longer recognized or possess diminished currency in
several jurisdictions.207 It appears that Judge Posner fears a threat to the
cause of action for “giving publicity to a matter concerning the private life
of another . . . if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public.”208 To say nothing of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, the
argument that the Alvarez ruling threatens the existence of this tort defies
logic.209 When within the boundaries outlined by the majority holding—that
is, a recording (i) in public, and (ii) of police in the public execution of their

202. See id.
203. Id. at 787-89.
204. See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 611 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting).
205. See id. (citing Lizette Alvarez, Spring Break Gets Tamer as World Watches
Online, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/us/spring-breakgets-tamer-as-world-watches-online.html; Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacyt2.html?pagewanted=all).
206. See id. at 612-13 (Posner, J., dissenting).
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (1977) (“(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other; (2) The right of privacy is invaded by (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or (b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; or (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as
stated in § 652D; or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public, as stated in § 652E.”).
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (emphasis supplied).
209. See id.
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duties—the subject matter of the recording is not private.210 The matter
publicized is “of legitimate concern to the public.”211 The performance of
public officials is not a private species of conduct; it is a public concern.212
It’s tautological, but where the elements are not satisfied, the tort cannot be
endangered.
9.

The First Amendment Right Will Not Inhibit Effective Law Enforcement

Judge Posner’s scare tactic that the open recording of police activity
will inhibit effective law enforcement is long on hyperbole, but short on
reasoning.213 First, nothing in the majority’s holding prohibits a charge in
the nature of obstruction of justice or disorderly conduct.214 Moreover, the
concern is unwarranted. A security camera has never been blamed for inhibiting the duties of bank or mall security guards—who exercise quasi-law
enforcement functions. The public (i.e., not “under cover” or behindclosed-doors) duties of a police officer call on no skill, right, or obligation,
that is impaired when filmed. Here, Judge Posner would prefer to ignore the
overbreadth of a statute to raise hypothetical alarm.215 Lastly, and perhaps
most frustratingly, Judge Posner acknowledged, rightfully, that in many
instances the recording of police in public creates a more accurate evidentiary record of actual criminal activity.216 This aids law enforcement in the
investigation by enabling police to apprehend and in the prosecution of
wrongdoers by creating probative and valuable evidence at trial.217 Although inhibiting the work of law enforcement is a cardinal concern of the
dissent, Judge Posner wishes to suppress accurate and potent inculpatory
evidence from use at criminal trials.218 By criminalizing the act of recording
police in public, Judge Posner bars the fruit of that act.219 More times than
not, that recording will assist law enforcement, not hinder it. Isn’t vindication of the victim’s rights at trial more important than the theoretical “baleful” effect on conversational privacy that Judge Posner so regrets?

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See id.
See id.
See id.
ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 614 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id. at 607.
Id. at 613-14.
Id. at 614.
See id.
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 614 (Posner J., dissenting).
See id.
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WHICH CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF REVIEW WILL FUTURE COURTS
APPLY?

While courts are unlikely to follow the Posner dissent, what level of
constitutional scrutiny will be applied? The Seventh Circuit, in Alvarez,
with some equivocation, essentially concluded that that the lesser burden of
intermediate scrutiny applied to the Illinois eavesdropping statute.220 The
First Circuit, in Glik, though positively declaring the existence of the right
to film public police activity, did not have occasion to weigh the appropriate standard of review in the case, an interlocutory appeal of a denial of the
police officers’ claim of qualified immunity.221 The question remains unanswered: will other courts apply strict or intermediate scrutiny in challenges
to respective state statutes that punish the recording of police officers in the
public exercise of their duties?
1.

The Content-Based vs. Content-Neutral Distinction

Strict scrutiny is applied to government regulation that differentially
burdens speech based on its content, that is, laws that discriminate depending on the “message, ideas [or] subject matter” of the speaker.222 Intermediate scrutiny is applied to laws that are content-neutral.223 Content-neutral
laws are those that infringe on a category of speech but do not make distinctions based on message or viewpoint.224 For instance, a ban on all billboards
is content-neutral, while a ban on billboards in favor of Republican political
candidates is content based, and egregiously so.225 Content-neutral laws
220. Id. at 603-05 (majority opinion). The Seventh Circuit stated that the essential
ingredients of intermediate scrutiny require the government to bear the burden of demonstrating “(1) content neutrality . . . [;] (2) an important public-interest justification for the
challenged regulation; and (3) a reasonably close fit between the law’s means and its ends.”
Id. at 605. The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated the same test with language differing in
form, not substance. The Court has said that content-neutral government regulation withstands constitutional scrutiny if it “furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression [in other
words, is content-neutral]; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,
70 (1981). See also Stone, supra note 81, at 191. By contrast, the strict scrutiny standard
under which content-based based statutes are reviewed demands (i) a compelling government justification for the challenged statute, (ii) that is narrowly tailored to serve that justification, and (iii) is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
221. See generally Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
222. Aschcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).
223. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 603-05.
224. See id.
225. See id.; Stone, supra note 81, at 198 & n.31.
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receive intermediate scrutiny because the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that they “pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or
viewpoints from the public dialogue.”226 First Amendment scholar Geoffrey
Stone has explained the rationale behind the content-based/content-neutral
distinction:
[T]he first amendment is concerned, not only with the extent to which a law reduces the total quantity of communication, but also—and perhaps even more fundamentally—
with the extent to which the law distorts public debate. Any
law that substantially prevents the communication of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of information violates the
first amendment except, perhaps, in the most extraordinary
of circumstances. This is so, not because such a law restricts “a lot” of speech, but because by effectively excising
a specific message from public debate, it mutilates “the
thinking process of the community” and is thus incompatible with the central precepts of the first amendment.227
Indeed, Stone cites as a representative example of a content-based restriction “laws or judicial decisions prohibiting ‘invasions of privacy’
through public disclosure of ‘embarrassing’ information.”228 He argues that
what makes such laws content-based, and also what makes such laws so
nefarious, is that they “substantially prevent the communication of particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information by all means.”229 By contrast,
“content-neutral restrictions limit the availability of only particular means
of communication. They thus leave speakers free to shift to other means of
expression.”230
2.

Statutes That Create Exceptions for Police Officers, the Media, and
Other Preferred Recording Parties are Content-Based and Deserve
Strict Scrutiny

At first blush, it appears that the Illinois eavesdropping statute, and
others that criminalize recording of police officers, are content-neutral.231
At their core, these laws generally proscribe the recordation by mechanical
device of a communication without the consent of all parties to the conver226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Stone, supra note 81, at 198.
Id.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200.
Id.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/14-2(a)(1) (State Bar Edition 2012).
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sation.232 Were the statute confined to this prohibition, alone, it would appear content-neutral.233 No “idea, viewpoint, or item of information” is isolated for punishment and “excised” from the public debate.234 Rather, the
statute, like a billboard ban, forces communication about the public acts of
police to other media, such as oral accounts. In practice, though contentneutral, the law strikes at political speech and thus infects the lifeblood of
the First Amendment.235 As a threshold matter, it bears emphasizing that
statutes that prohibit filming of police publicly performing their official
duties censor the most potent documentary evidence of the performance of
their essential government function.236 It has been oft-repeated that:
[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The
First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such
political expression in order “to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.”237
While the appearance of content neutrality was sufficient to placate the
Seventh Circuit in Alvarez, a closer reading of the statute, in totality, militates in favor of a finding that the law is, indeed, content-based.238 It is a
well-settled proposition, argued by the ACLU in the case, that the government runs afoul of the First Amendment by “taking the right to speak from
some and giving it to others.”239 Such laws create a favored class of speech
based on content and are all but dead-on-arrival under strict scrutiny.240
While the all-party consent requirement, in isolation, is contentneutral, the Illinois eavesdropping statute provides a full menu of exemptions for law enforcement officers, public officials, media organizations,
and certain business corporations.241 Among this panoply of carve-outs are
exemptions from criminal penalty for:

232. See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
233. See id.
234. See Stone, supra note 81, at 198-200.
235. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3 (State Bar Edition 2012); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (defining political expression as core of First Amendment).
236. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
237. Id.; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 484).
238. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3 (State Bar Edition 2012).
239. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 603 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010)).
240. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 603.
241. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3 (State Bar Edition 2012).
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the media and others that publicize “[a] broadcast by radio, television or otherwise whether it be a broadcast or
recorded for the purpose of later broadcasts of any function
where the public is in attendance and the conversations are
overheard incidental to the main purpose for which such
broadcasts are then being made;”
anyone that records “the proceedings of any meeting required to be open by the Open Meetings Act;”
manufacturers or retailers of food and drug products who
make a “[r]ecording or listening with the aid of any device
to incoming telephone calls of phone lines publicly listed
or advertised as consumer ‘hotlines’ by manufacturers or
retailers of food and drug products;”
various recordings made by police officers, including
“[r]ecordings made simultaneously with the use of an incar video camera recording of an oral conversation between
a uniformed peace officer, who has identified his or her office, and a person in the presence of the peace officer
whenever (i) an officer assigned a patrol vehicle is conducting an enforcement stop; or (ii) patrol vehicle emergency lights are activated or would otherwise be activated
if not for the need to conceal the presence of law enforcement.”
Certain recording by “telephone monitoring device by either (1) a corporation or other business entity engaged in
marketing or opinion research or (2) a corporation or other
business entity engaged in telephone solicitation . . . to record or listen to oral telephone solicitation conversations or
marketing or opinion research conversations by an employee of the corporation or other business entity.”242
Notwithstanding the exceptions from the statute’s all-party consent requirement for police, media, and, remarkably, “retailers of food and drug
products” and pesky telemarketers, the Seventh Circuit found that the statute was content-neutral because the elevation of certain “preferred” speakers over others only renders a regulation content-based “when the government discriminates among private speakers, not when it facilitates its own

242.

Id.
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speech.”243 This justification marks an inexplicable error in an otherwise
well-reasoned opinion.244 For one, this argument is unsubstantiated, and, for
that matter, the court cited no authority for the proposition.245 Further, the
court’s argument is insupportable. The elevation of government speech over
the commensurate message of private speakers is the definition of censorship. The principle espoused by the majority is the province of an autocracy
where state-run media censor private speakers and publicize the government-sanctioned message. China’s censorship boards or the preeminence of
Pravda come to mind. The argument, even if true, cannot be applied to the
Illinois statute where the government does, in fact, “discriminate[] among
private speakers.”246 What else, other than private discrimination, explains
the criminalization of this form of speech when the message is about the
performance—positive or negative—of police officers but not when it is the
content of a public meeting, inadvertently recorded private conversations in
media broadcast, telemarketer solicitations, or calls to “consumer hotlines”
recorded by supermarkets and pharmaceutical companies?247 To say more
would be superfluous. The statute contains content-based discrimination
and, thus, should face strict scrutiny.248
This analysis, applied to all-party consent statutes, other than Illinois’s
inartfully drafted law, yields the same conclusion.249 For instance, Montana
criminalizes the recording of a conversation “by use of a hidden electronic
or mechanical device that reproduces a human conversation without the
knowledge of all parties to the conversation.”250 However, the Montana
statute creates exceptions where the recorded parties are:
“elected or appointed public officials or to public employees when the transcription or recording is done in the
performance of official duty;”
“persons speaking at public meetings;”

243. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 603-05. The majority expressed concern with the statute’s
exemption for live broadcasts “by radio, television, or otherwise,” which appears to subordinate some private speakers in preference for others while also violating the principle that the
institutional press, is accorded no special entitlements. Id. at 604. However, it declined to
address the issue because it was not at issue in the ACLU’s challenge. Id.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. Id.; See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3 (State Bar Edition 2012).
247. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3 (State Bar Edition 2012).
248. See id.
249. See, e.g, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(1)(c) (2013) MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272,
§ 99(D)(1) (2013).
250. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(1)(c) (2013).
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“persons given warning of the transcription or recording,
and if one person provides the warning, either party may
record;” or
“a health care facility . . . or a government agency that
deals with health care if the recording is of a health care
emergency telephone communication made to the facility
or agency.”251
Massachusetts offers fewer exceptions but still declines to proscribe
recordings by “investigative or law enforcement officers . . . for the purposes of ensuring the safety of any law enforcement officer or agent thereof
who is acting in an undercover capacity, or as a witness for the commonwealth” and “a financial institution” that records “telephone communications with its corporate or institutional trading partners in the ordinary
course of its business.”252 It is clear from these examples that most, if not
all, statutes that proscribe protected First Amendment recordings of police
officers should face strict scrutiny where they insulate preferred speakers
and subjects.253
C.

IS SURREPTITIOUS RECORDING OF POLICE IN THE PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES PROTECTED FROM PUNISHMENT BY
THE FIRST AMENDMENT?

The most pressing—and least predictable—question that remains in
the wake of Glik and Alvarez is whether the positive First Amendment right
conferred in those cases will extend to surreptitious recordings of police
officers.254 While Glik offered robust support for the right, the plaintiff was
recording the officers in plain view.255 It is critical to note that the opinion
did not discuss or reference Commonwealth v. Hyde, where the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld against constitutional challenge the
conviction of a motorist who clandestinely recorded officers during a traffic

251. Id.
252. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(D)(1)(e), (f) (2013).
253. See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 603-05 (7th Cir. 2012). Another justification that future courts might use to apply intermediate scrutiny is that the act of “filming” is
“expressive conduct” rather than “pure” speech. See supra notes 155-65 and accompanying
text. The Supreme Court, in a line of cases of older vintage, has stated that some wordless
expression, while technically conduct, is so entangled with expression that any infringement
is tested under intermediate scrutiny. Id. The majority opinion in Alvarez, probably rightfully, disagreed that the act of recording matters of public importance was “conduct,” even
“expressive conduct.” Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595-96.
254. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607 n.13.
255. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2011).
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stop.256 Perhaps the silence speaks volumes. Likewise, in Alvarez, the
ACLU’s carefully coordinated test case proposed only to openly record
officers.257 The Seventh Circuit majority nominally addressed the distinction in a footnote: “We are not suggesting that the First Amendment protects only open recording. The distinction between open and concealed recording, however, may make a difference in the intermediate calculus because surreptitious recording brings stronger privacy interests into play.” 258
Judge Posner, ever the skeptic, unsettled the issue further with a perceptive
observation:
It is small consolation to be told by the majority that “the
ACLU plans to record openly, thus giving the police and
others notice that they are being recorded[.]” All the ACLU
means is that it won’t try to hide its recorder from the
conversants whom it wants to record, though since the typical recorder nowadays is a cell phone it will be hidden in
plain view. A person who doesn’t want his conservation to
be recorded will have to keep a sharp eye out for anyone
nearby holding a cell phone, which in many urban settings
is almost everyone.259
On this point, it seems Judge Posner has it right. First, the distinction
between open and secret recording is practicably untenable and captures too
much valuable political speech to pass constitutional muster.260 Second, as
discussed below, the distinction is unnecessary because the balance in favor
of the important free speech justifications for invalidating the laws vis-à-vis
recording of police in public, and against the comparatively more modest
privacy interests of other conversants, is not tipped in the opposite direction
when the recording is concealed.261
1.

The States that Proscribe Certain Surreptitious Recordation

In some instances, if other statutory elements are met, several states
criminalize surreptitious recording of police officers.262 As it stands, two
states, Montana and Massachusetts, criminalize surreptitious, but not open,
recordation of conversations without the consent of all parties and without
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Commonwealth. v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 967 (Mass. 2001).
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 588.
Id. at 607 n.13 (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001)).
Id. at 613 (Posner, J., dissenting) (internal parenthetical omitted).
See infra notes 261-325 and accompanying text.
See id.
Alderman, supra note 54, at 489-96 & app. 1.
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imposing a reasonable expectation of privacy on the recorded parties.263
Illinois and Oregon are the only states in the country that make illegal the
recordation of conversations (i) both open and surreptitious, (ii) without the
assent of all parties, and (iii) without a reasonable expectation of privacy
requirement.264 One more state, Nevada, proscribes only surreptitious recording without all party consent, while also requiring a reasonable expectation of privacy of the recorded parties.265 Finally, two more states, Iowa
and Kansas, prohibit (i) only the surreptitious, not open, recordation of conversations; (ii) without the consent of one party (which includes the recorder if also a conversant, but would not include a third party like Simon Glik);
and (iii) where the parties own a reasonable expectation of privacy.266 All
other states do not make a distinction between open and surreptitious recording in delimiting the universe of illegal conduct.267
2.

Enforcing the Distinction is Impracticable

Practically speaking, as Judge Posner instructs, it would be unmanageable for states to permit open recording of police yet criminalize surreptitious recording, regardless of the other particulars of the respective wiretapping laws.268 Cell phones are capable of so many functions that an officer will not reasonably be able to ascertain whether he is being recorded.269 A bystander with a cell phone in hand might be recording a police
officer on a device—or application on a device—with audio capability, or
might be performing a legal function not within the ambit of wiretapping
laws, such as photographing the encounter, sending a text message, or, by
way of example in Simon Glik’s case on Boston Common, recording video
of the ducks in Frog Pond.270 Moreover, while a few state statutes criminalize surreptitious recording of police officers in public, but not open recording, it does not appear that any court has established a test creating an

263. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(1)(c) (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 §§
99(B)(4), (C) (2013).
264. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/14-2(a)(1) (State Bar Edition 2012); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 165.535-540 (2013). See supra note 54 and accompanying text. See also Alderman, supra
note 54, at 489-96 & app. 1.
265. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.610-690 (2011). See Alderman, supra note 54, at 48996 & app. 1.
266. IOWA CODE §§ 727.8, 808B.1-.2 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4001-4002
(2012). See Alderman, supra note 54, at 489-96 & app. 1.
267. See Alderman, supra note 54, at 489-96 & app. 1.
268. See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 613 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting).
269. See id.
270. See id.
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open/secret dichotomy.271 Such a test would be unworkable, as the distinction is easily collapsed.272 For instance, would the test set an objective or
subjective standard? Certainly a subjective test would collapse the distinction between open and surreptitious recording because an officer could always testify that he or she did not know she was being recorded, rendering
the recordation impermissibly secret.273 In other words, the test would render illusory the First Amendment protection for open recording.274
An objective test would also be problematic. It may be easier to administer because the inquiry would focus on the actions of the recorder, not
the subjective perception and recollection of the officer.275 For instance, a
recording party could present evidence or testimony attesting to holding the
camera in plain view.276 There is some modicum of protection for the constitutional right because the prosecution bears the burden of proving surreptitious recording as an element of the crime.277 However, this in no way
provides absolute protection against mistake and overzealous prosecution of
open recorders wrongfully accused of hiding a recording device.278
3.

Enforcing the Distinction Captures Too Much Important Political
Speech to be Constitutional

Even assuming the test could be administered fairly and without error,
it leaves an intolerably large blind spot that would still criminalize many
valuable recordings of potent First Amendment value.279 Consider one of
the most iconic and newsworthy videos in U.S. history: George Holliday’s
grainy recording of four Los Angeles police officers savagely beating mo271. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(1)(c) (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 §§
99(B)(4), (C) (2013).
272. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 613 (Posner, J., dissenting).
273. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 833 N.E.2d 1113, 1125 (Mass. 2005) (holding defendant’s subjective unawareness of security cameras did not render recording “secret”
where cameras were “in plain sight.”).
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. Rivera, 833 N.E.2d at 1125.
279. Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 976 (Mass. 200) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[The public’s role as watchdog] cannot be performed if citizens must fear
criminal reprisals when they seek to hold government officials responsible by recording—
secretly recording on occasion—an interaction between a citizen and a police officer.”). See
Timothy Williams, Recorded on a Suspect’s Hidden MP3 Player, a Bronx Detective Faces
12
Perjury
Charges,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
7,
2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/nyregion/07cop.html?_r=0 (describing surreptitious
recording of custodial interrogation that revealed detective’s serial perjury at attempted
murder trial).
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torist Rodney King with nightsticks.280 The video led to a prodigious
amount of national news coverage and prompted a frank discussion on
race.281 In this regard, the video itself was tantamount to political speech at
the so-called “core” of the First Amendment.282 The video served as a catalyst for the federal indictment of four police officers, sweeping reform in
police departments not just in California but across the nation, and, more
ominously, widespread politically motivated rioting in Los Angeles.283 The
video galvanized such an incessant national political stir that President
George H.W. Bush was compelled to make a national comment in the days
following the video.284 He told a wary nation: “What I saw made me sick . .
. sickening to see the beating that was rendered. There’s no way in my view
to explain it away. It was outrageous.”285 In response to the riots that spread
across Los Angeles following the state court acquittal of the officers, the
President made a national speech vowing that the U.S. Department of Justice would seek charges.286 A commission tasked with investigating King’s
beating spearheaded dramatic reforms in the scandal-wracked Los Angeles
Police Department and noted that it “owes its existence to the George Holliday videotape.”287 Outside government, the video helped spawn a fierce
and politically motivated genre of “gangster rap” that discussed feelings of
oppression in the African American inner city and spoke of violence and
crime in raw terms.288 This nascent form of music, like the video that assisted in its birth, finds its home in this same “core” of First Amendment political expression.289

280. Rubin et al., supra note 171.
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. President Bush Sickened by Rodney King Case, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 22, 1991,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2012/mar/22/archive-1991-president-bush-sickenedrodney-king.
285. Id.
286. Bush, George H.W., President, United States of America, Address to the Nation
on the Civil Disturbances in Los Angeles, California (May 1, 1992) (transcript available in
the George Bush Presidential Library). See United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1426 (9th
Cir. 1994).
287. See Rubin et al., supra note 171; REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT ii (1991) (on file with author) (“Our commission
owes its existence to the George Holliday videotape of the Rodney King incident. Whether
there even would have been a Los Angeles Police Department investigation without the
video is doubtful, since the efforts of King’s brother . . . to file a complaint were frustrated,
and the report the involved officers was falsified.”).
288. See Jeanita W. Richardson & Kim A. Scott, Rap Music and its Violent Progeny:
America’s Culture of Violence in Context, 71 J. NEGRO EDUC. 175, 175-92 (2002).
289. See id.
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While it is incontrovertible that Holliday’s video was a paradigmatic
example of First Amendment political speech, it is also likely that Holliday
would have broken the law under any wiretapping statute of the one-party
or all-party consent species that criminalized surreptitious recording.290 Just
after midnight on March 3, 1991, Holliday was woken up by sirens.291 Upon seeing the officers viciously attacking King, he retrieved a handheld
Sony camcorder and stepped out onto the balcony of his apartment to film
the disgusting scene.292 Under the cover of darkness, above the officers, at a
considerable distance, Holliday was a shadow.293 His recording would
probably not be considered open where no one else saw him making the
film, and the officers could not be reasonably expected to have even constructive awareness.294 Or, consider the case of Oscar Grant, the Oakland
teenager whose shooting death, at the hands of Bay Area Rapid Transit
police officer, led to riots reminiscent of Los Angeles in 1992 and to the
manslaughter conviction of the offending officer.295 Grant’s wrongful death
was captured on cell phones of onlookers on a departing train.296 A court
could conceivably determine that a recording made behind the dark glass of
a train car, where an officer could not reasonably be expected to have notice
of being filmed, was clandestine.297 The problem, then, is that it is these
videos memorializing, as they do, the activity of officers when they think
no one is looking that strike closest to the truth.298 And, it is these truths that
contribute the most meaningful messages to our political discourse.299 If, as
our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, the highest degree of First
Amendment protection should be afforded its “core” of messages informing
the debate on “public issues” and the “interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes,” the open/surreptitious distinction in
wiretapping laws should not be permitted as applied to recording of po290. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1) (State Bar Edition 2012). See also
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 976 (Mass. 2004) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
291. Michael Goldstein, The Other Beating, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006,
http://www.latimes.com/la-tm-holidayfeb19,0,581354.story.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See Demian Bulwa, BART Urges Patience over Video of Shooting, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 10, 2009, http://www.policeone.com/communications/articles/1771860-Video-ofBART-officer-fatally-shooting-fight-suspect-surfaces/.
296. Id.
297. See id.
298. See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 614 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that videotapes present one of the most accurate forms of evidence). See
also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007) (describing the uniquely probative nature
of videotape evidence).
299. See Stone, supra note 81, at 198-200.
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lice.300 At least in this context, the ban on surreptitious recording threatens
to strike too deeply into the core of protected expression.301
Also, in the constitutional calculus of intermediate or strict scrutiny,
there is no public-interest justification that would tip the scales in favor of
enforcing a ban on surreptitious recordation of police.302 The Seventh Circuit stated in dicta that intermediate scrutiny would be the standard of review on a facial or as-applied challenge to a law proscribing clandestine
recordation of a police officer.303 The Seventh Circuit appears to suggest
that intermediate scrutiny would apply because the same protected interest—dissemination and reception of public information—is implicated by a
law barring concealed recordation of police officers.304 It bears noting that
intermediate scrutiny would likely also apply to laws that allow open, but
ban surreptitious, filming of police officers in the public administration of
their duties.305 This is because, like content-neutral regulations that infringe
on protected speech, the law imposes a restriction on just one “manner” of
vindicating the right to record police officers.306 The Supreme Court has
held that so-called content-neutral “time, place or manner restriction[s]”
receive intermediate scrutiny.307
Here, the Alvarez majority also suggested that “surreptitious recording
brings stronger privacy interests into play” that could merit a different result under intermediate scrutiny.308 This seems unlikely. The governmental
objective of protecting conversational privacy is more protected by a ban on
surreptitious recordation only to the extent the parties have subjective
awareness that they are being filmed and are able to relocate to more private environs.309 However, as discussed above, requiring the recorded party’s subjective awareness of the recordation would render illusory protection for the speech right because aggrieved police officers will rarely be
independently aware that they are being filmed while engaged in their du300. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
301. See id.; Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 976 (Mass. 2004) (Marshall,
C.J., dissenting).
302. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 604-09.
303. Id. at 607 n.13.
304. See id.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 605. The test has been articulated slightly differently as the
“intermediate scrutiny” standard applied to content-neutral regulations of general application. Compare Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) with Turner Broad Sys. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994). The intermediate standard of review applied to time, place, and
manner restrictions requires that they are (i) reasonable, (ii) content neutral, (iii) are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and (iv) “leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.” Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481 (citation omitted).
308. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607 n.13.
309. See id.
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ties, making criminal all acts of recording prior to the officer’s discovery. 310
Moreover, even open recording is susceptible to criminal penalty if an officer claims unawareness or was unreasonably ignorant that he was on camera, and no other evidence can support the recorder’s contention that he was
filming in “plain view.”311 In this sense, it cannot be said that a ban on surreptitious recording is “narrowly tailored” to serve the government interest
of protecting conversational privacy or that a ban on concealed recording
“leave[s] open ample alternative channels of communication.”312
4.

The Government Interest in Protected Conversational Privacy is not
Better Served by Laws Banning Surreptitious Recordation of Police
Officers

As discussed above, the surreptitious nature of the recording would not
change the balance that the Alvarez majority rightfully placed between the
First Amendment right at issue and the interest of protecting conversational
privacy.313 The right is the same—dissemination and reception of public
information to contribute messages to important political dialogues.314 That
message is no different whether captured by a recording in plain view or
one hidden from open sight.315 Likewise, the privacy interests of the
conversants, if any, are just as minimal.316 Again, police officers have no
expectation of privacy in the public execution of their duties, whether it be
performing an arrest or speaking to a civilian in earshot of the public. 317
Likewise, the civilian conversant is divested of a privacy expectation where
the officer is likely to relate the information in a public police report, in
public testimony, or to other officers, witnesses, or the media.318 Seldom is
the scenario when a conversation with a police officer could reasonably be
expected to be “confidential.”319 The factors contributing to the analysis of
laws prohibiting open recording are unchanged when the recording is concealed.320 It seems that the Seventh Circuit majority, in its Spartan footnote,
has conflated the surreptitious nature of the recorder with the locus of the

310. See supra notes 268-78 and accompanying text.
311. See id.
312. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481 (citation omitted).
313. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 604-09.
314. Id. at 596.
315. See id.; Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 976 (Mass. 2004) (Marshall,
C.J., dissenting).
316. See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 604-09 (7th Cir. 2012).
317. See supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
318. See id.
319. See id.
320. See id.
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recording.321 For indeed, the calculation changes immeasurably where the
recorder has “bugged” a private office, intruded on a hushed conversation
in a restaurant booth, or invaded a private residence or automobile to capture a conversation with a police officer.322 While all of those recordings
would probably be achieved by surreptitious interception, it is not the clandestine nature of the recording that elevates the substantiality of the privacy
interests, but the intrusion into an objectively private location that is protected by legitimate property, trespassing, and other laws.323 A ban on the
former alone captures too much protected speech to pass constitutional
muster, while a ban on the latter involves privacy expectations of such a
degree to place in serious doubt the propriety of the recorder’s interception.324 For all the foregoing reasons, the open/surreptitious distinction
should be of no constitutional significance.325
D.

ARE OFFICERS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL
LIABILITY FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARRESTS OF RECORDERS OF
PUBLIC POLICE ACTIVITY?

Even where the right to film police in the exercise of their public duties has been positively declared, the risk remains that it is a right without a
remedy.326 Congress established § 1983 so that violations of constitutional
liberties by persons acting under color of law could be vindicated.327 However, government actors are entitled to an affirmative defense pursuant to
the doctrine of qualified immunity that would defeat a claim for civil liability.328 Qualified immunity will only attach if (i) the right at issue was not
“clearly established” at the time of the alleged civil rights violation, and (ii)
“a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct violated
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”329 The courts may address the prongs in
either sequence.330 The First Circuit, in Glik, has already held that the right
to record police in the public performance of their duties is “clearly established.”331 Following Alvarez, it is highly likely that the Seventh Circuit
321. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607 n.13.
322. See supra notes 188-205 and accompanying text.
323. See id.
324. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
325. See id.
326. Potere, supra note 27, at 289 (“Unfortunately, courts that use their Pearson
discretion to avoid determining whether a constitutional right exists and then declare that a
right is not clearly established can do so ad infinitum. This leads to the undesirable consequence that a right might never be established.”).
327. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
328. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
329. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 81 (1st Cir. 2011).
330. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
331. Glik, 655 F.3d at 84-85.
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will follow suit.332 However, there is a potential circuit split. The Third Circuit, in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle—a decision that predates Glik and Alvarez—granted a police officer’s claim of qualified immunity after determining that the right to record police at a traffic stop was not clearly established.333 It remains unanswered whether future courts will conclude—in
the wake of Glik and Alvarez—that the right to record police is not “clearly
established.” However, it appears, for a variety of reasons, the Kelly case is
an outlier, and the right affirmatively established in Glik and Alvarez (and a
smattering of federal district court and state cases) is “clearly established.”334 Nonetheless, the question has serious implications for those, like
Simon Glik or scores of wrongfully arrested civilians in Illinois, who seek
to vindicate an unconstitutional deprivation of their right to record the public activities of police officers.
1.

The “Clearly Established” Framework

The Supreme Court’s guidance is frustratingly cryptic on how to determine whether a putative constitutional right is “clearly established” in a §
1983 action.335 The Court has instructed that the government official must
have “fair warning” that his actions would violate a protected right.336 “Fair
warning” in large measure is derived from the constructive notice provided
by court opinions.337 A case on point in the jurisdiction or a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” delineating the right will provide this
requisite “fair warning.”338 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not provided further illustration of how many “cases of persuasive authority” constitute a “robust consensus.”339 In Glik, the First Circuit held that a case
decided ten years earlier, Iacobucci v. Boulter, conclusively established that
there exists in the First Circuit “a right to film government officials or matters of public interest in public space.”340 Iacobucci, in concert with a raft of
federal district court and state cases cited by the court, gave the officers
“fair warning” of the unconstitutionality of their conduct.341
332. See id.
333. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 259 (3d Cir. 2010).
334. See notes 335-370 and accompanying text.
335. See Potere, supra note 27, at 287-88.
336. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-41 (2002).
337. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (quoting Wilton v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)).
338. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2011).
339. See Potere, supra note 27, at 287-88. The First Circuit has suggested that two
“closely related” cases may be sufficient to find that a right is clearly established. Wilson v.
Boston, 421 F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 2005).
340. Glik, 655 F.3d at 84-85.
341. Id.
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There is a “Robust Consensus” of Persuasive Authority

Now that two circuit courts of appeals have declared a positive First
Amendment liberty to record police officers in the execution of the public
duties, there is likely a “robust consensus” of persuasive authority that render the right “clearly established.”342 What is more, there is no authority at
the circuit level or in the federal district courts that stands contrary; no federal court has expressly held that the Constitution does not protect the
right.343
Likewise, two more circuit courts in abbreviated fashion and in opinions that have not generated the attention of Glik and Alvarez, appear to
have aligned themselves with the reasoning of the First and Seventh Circuits.344 In Smith v. City of Cumming, the plaintiffs, James and Barbara
Smith, filed a § 1983 action against the City of Cumming Police Department.345 The Smiths, upset over a prior traffic stop, repeatedly filmed police
pulling over other vehicles to create an evidentiary record of what they believed was the department’s abusive use of traffic stops.346 While the
Smiths were never arrested, they alleged that they were continually “harassed” when videotaping officers.347 The Eleventh Circuit offered terse
recognition of “a First Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct.”348
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint, determining that the Smiths
had “not shown that the Defendants’ actions violated that right.”349 Similarly, in Fordyce v. City of Seattle, the Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment to police officers who allegedly assaulted a marcher who
attempted to film police interference with a public protest.350 In remanding,
the Ninth Circuit held that “a genuine issue of material fact does exist regarding whether Fordyce was assaulted and battered by a Seattle police
342. See Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2084.
343. See generally ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
344. See Smith v. Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (recognizing First
Amendment right to “record matters of public interest”); Fordyce v. Seattle, 55 F.3d 436,
439 (9th Cir. 1995).
345. Smith, 212 F.3d at 1332-33.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1333.
348. Id. In support, the Eleventh Circuit cited numerous cases. Id. See Blackston v.
Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that plaintiffs’ interest in filming public
meetings is protected by the First Amendment); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439
(9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest”);
Iacobucci v. Boulter, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7010, No. CIV.A. 94-10531 (D. Mass, Mar. 26,
1997) (unpublished opinion) (finding that an independent reporter has a protected right
under the First Amendment and state law to videotape public meetings).
349. Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333.
350. Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 438.
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officer in an attempt to prevent or dissuade him from exercising his First
Amendment right to film matters of public interest.”351 The court’s affirmation of the First Amendment right, though coming in a brusque recognition
in the secondary clause of one sentence, nonetheless operates as persuasive
authority.352 Indeed, the First Circuit in Glik found that the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits had, in fact, positively affirmed the First Amendment right to
film police in public.353 It explained that those courts’ abrupt declarations of
the right evinced the “self evident” nature of the issue.354
Importantly, the consensus of persuasive authority extends to federal
district court cases that also have “clearly established” the First Amendment
right.355 In Robinson v. Fetterman, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania awarded damages pursuant to § 1983 to a truck
driver twice arrested for criminal harassment after videotaping police at a
truck inspection point on a state highway.356 The court further held that the
First Amendment preserved Robinson’s right to express his concern about
the safety of truck inspections through videotaping officers.357 Robinson’s
actions, the court reasoned like the First and Seventh Circuits in Glik and
Alvarez, fell comfortably within the scope of the First Amendment’s protection of the right to gather information about matters of public interest. 358
The court wrote: “videotaping is a legitimate means of gathering information for public dissemination and can often provide cogent evidence, as
it did in this case.”359 Similarly, in Cirelli v. Town of Johnston Sch. Dist.,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island held that a teacher’s
videotaping of hazardous conditions at school was aimed at gathering information on a matter of public concern, which was protected by the First
Amendment and subject only to permissible time, place, and manner restrictions.360 These cases are further arrows in the quiver of persuasive authority that renders the right to film police “clearly established” in future §
1983 challenges.361

351. Id. at 439.
352. Id.
353. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2011).
354. Id. at 85.
355. See Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Cirelli v.
Town of Johnston Sch. Dist., 897 F. Supp. 663, 668 (D.R.I. 1995) (holding that teacher had
First Amendment right to videotape potentially hazardous working conditions at school,
which were a matter of public concern).
356. Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 538-40.
357. Id. at 541.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Cirelli, 897 F. Supp. at 668.
361. See Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541; Cirelli, 897 F. Supp. at 668.
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Kelly is Likely an Outlier

In Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit concluded that the U.S. District Court erred in holding that the
§ 1983 plaintiff’s right to videotape the officers conducting his traffic stop
was “clearly established” under the First Amendment.362 Deciding without
the benefit of the Glik or Alvarez opinions, the court determined that the
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Smith v. City of Cumming and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s ruling in Robinson v.
Fetterman were “insufficiently analogous to the facts of this case.”363 Noting that the right to record police is “subject to reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions,” the Third Circuit emphasized that—even where generally protected under the First Amendment’s protection for the “right to
receive information and ideas”—videotaping is “inherently dangerous” in
the setting of a traffic stop.364 It is critically important to note that throughout the country, the “clearly established” analysis changed since the Glik
and Alvarez opinions.365 Cases in two different circuits of such magnitude,
it must be said, put officers on “fair notice” of the constitutional right, at
minimum, to openly film public police activity.366 Moreover, as the First
Circuit noted, Kelly is easily distinguished on its facts.367 The court was not
dismissive of the right, as Judge Posner’s dissent, but stressed the significance of the fact that the recording occurred during a traffic stop. Indeed,
the court wrote “the right to videotape police officers during traffic stops
was not clearly established.”368 Not insignificantly, the recording also may
have been surreptitious, as the officers contended they were not aware the
plaintiff activated a recording device in his lap.369 If anything, to the extent
Kelly has any currency, the case stands for the proposition that a constitutional right to surreptitiously record a traffic stop is not “clearly established.”370

362. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 259 (3d Cir. 2010).
363. Id. at 262. See Smith v. Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1332 (11th Cir. 2000); Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d. 534.
364. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262.
365. See id.
366. See id.
367. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2011).
368. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 263 (“[W]e recognized that the right to receive information
and ideas was well established.”).
369. Id. at 251.
370. See id. at 262-63.
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Conclusion

While the First and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals opinions in Glik
v. Cunniffe and ACLU v. Alvarez answered many questions—and vastly
deepened the well of persuasive authority regarding the First Amendment
right to record public police activity—there remain unresolved issues. First,
though an insightful commentary, Judge Posner’s dissent in Alvarez is too
attenuated from recognized First Amendment jurisprudence to be a model
for future courts. It seems highly likely that future courts addressing the
issue as one of first impression will follow the thoroughly reasoned opinion
of the majority. Second, while the Alvarez majority determined that the
Illinois eavesdropping statute was “content-neutral,” and thereby applied
the intermediate scrutiny standard, this appears to be error. All-party consent statutes that criminalize the recordation of police in the performance of
their public duties contain numerous exemptions for police, media, telemarketers, and others. Therefore, the statutes elevate certain speakers based
on content. As such, the Seventh Circuit should have applied strict scrutiny,
as should future courts. Third, although the Glik and Alvarez opinions only
extend constitutional shelter to “open” recording, surreptitious recording is
equally deserving of First Amendment protection. Enforcing the
open/surreptitious distinction is impracticable, and, more importantly, the
“core” political expression threatened by a prohibition on concealed recording remains of the best constitutional pedigree, while the government interest in “conversational privacy” is no greater where neither the police nor
those who converse with them have an objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy. Moreover, the parties are reasonably protected from intrusion
into sensitive conversations by property, trespass, and other laws that may
not be derogated, even in pursuit of the First Amendment right to record.
Lastly, following Glik and Alvarez, it appears that there is “a robust consensus of persuasive authority,” rendering the right to record public police activity “clearly established.”

